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THE QUIET REVOLUTION
Conservatives Continue Federalism Resurgence by Expanding State
Immunity
Legal Times
Monday, July 12,1999
Curt A. Levey
The highlight of the Supreme Court's
just-ended term may well have come on
its last day, June 23, when a trio of
decisions expanded the boundaries of
state sovereign immunity and prompted
talk of a constitutional sea change. The
cases cap a decade of resurgent
federalism, which former Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger has described as
"one of the three or four major shifts in
constitutionalism we've seen in two
centuries." While such talk may well be
premature, it is now clear that the Court is
unabashedly pursuing a federalism agenda.
The three cases--each involving state
immunity from federal claims brought by
private parties--were decided by identical
5-4 votes. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and
Clarence Thomas formed the majority in
each decision.
In Alden v. Maine, 67 U.S.L.W. 4601,
the issue was whether Maine could be
sued in its own courts under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The suit by
state probation officers seeking overtime
pay was filed in state court after a federal
court dismissed it on sovereign immunity
grounds. But the state court route is now
blocked as well after the Supreme Court
ruled that sovereign immunity from
federal claims extends to state courts.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
noted that "were the rule to be different
here, the National Government would
wield greater power in the state courts
than in its own judicial instrumentalities."
The other two cases - Florida v.
College Savings Bank, 67 U.S.L.W. 4580,
and College Savings Bank v. Florida, 67
U.S.L.W. 4590 - involved federal litigation
between a savings bank and the state of
Florida concerning the bank's patented
college investment plan. The bank claimed
violations of federal patent and trademark
law. The Supreme Court threw out both
claims, ruling that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority when it authorized
private suits against states for patent
infringement and Lanham Act violations.
The sharpest point of debate in the
three decisions was the majority's
contention, summarized in Alden, that
"the scope of the States' immunity from
suit is demarcated not by the text of the
11th Amendment alone but by
fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design."
The more liberal justices, who have
been known to find a constitutional
penumbra or two of their own,
nonetheless complained bitterly about this
extratextual interpretation. Dissenting in
Alden, Justice David Souter accused the
majority of inventing "a conception of
state sovereign immunity that is true
neither to history nor to the structure of
the Constitution." Souter called the
majority view "unrealistic,"
"indefensible," and probably "fleeting."
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The significance of Alden and the
College Savings cases may well lie more
with their relationship to other recent
federalism decisions than with the
substance of the decisions themselves. In
particular, the three cases clearly
demonstrate that the Supreme Court
meant what it said in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) . In
Seminole, the Court said that Congress
cannot abrogate state immunity under its
Article I powers, but the justices reiterated
that explicit abrogation is permitted under
the enforcement clause (Section 5) of the
14th Amendment. After Alden, the
Seminole analysis clearly applies to federal
claims in both state and federal court.
With the Article I route to abrogation
of state immunity blocked by Seminole,
and the state court option blocked by
Alden, Congress and sympathetic courts
will be tempted to characterize federal
statutes as enforcement clause
enactments. Yet that route is narrower
after City of Boerne, which restricted
Congress' ability to legislate under the
enforcement clause by demanding"
congruence and proportionality" between
14th Amendment violations by the states
and Congress' chosen remedy.
The Supreme Court presumed in the
Alden and decided in the College Savings
cases that Congress could not rely on its
enforcement clause authority to abrogate
state sovereignty under the applicable
federal statutes. The Court explored the
City of Boerne congruence and
proportionality requirement at length in
the context of patent law, but ultimately
concluded that the requirement had not
been met, because "Congress identified
no pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations."
The Court's continued use of the City
of Boerne test this term, in combination
with Seminole, suggests that sovereign
immunity stands as a meaningful limit on
federal power. This calls into question the
viability of private claims against states
under federal accommodation statutes--
like the Family and Medical Leave Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The problem those statutes seek
to remedy is not one of similarly situated
persons being treated differently, the
hallmark of an equal protection violation.
Thus, there is arguably no 14th
Amendment violation for Congress to
remedy, causing the statute to fail City of
Boerne's congruence and proportionality
test. Harvard Law School Professor
Laurence Tribe, who once dismissed the
congruence and proportionality test as
"rhetoric," now concludes that it is "very
clear that even when there is a 14th
Amendment right at stake, the Court will
scrutinize very closely whether
congressional legislation is really
necessary."
Alden and the College Savings cases
confirm and strengthen a decade-long
resurgence of federalism, guided by the
same five justices who prevailed last
month. The Court has come a long way
since Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
declared that the states would have to
depend on the political process to protect
their sovereignty.
This rebirth of federalism began rather
humbly with the Court's 1992 decision in
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144.
Together, New York and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), prohibit
Congress from commandeering a state's
legislative or executive branches to
administer or enact federal regulations.
Seminole, along with Alden and the
College Savings cases, represent another
facet of protecting state sovereignty.
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Specifically, they constrain Congress'
ability to impose federal mandates on the
states by way of private lawsuits, a favorite
Congressional technique. The boldest of
the decade's federalism decisions are
certainly City of Boerne and United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which
resurrected the enumerated powers
doctrine by setting limits on Congress'
authority to legislate under the
enforcement and commerce clauses.
Although the rebirth of federalism in
the 19 9 0s has been remarkable, the
hysterical reaction from critics of last
month's trio of decisions seems
exaggerated. Tribe warns of "pernicious
consequences for the enforcement of
federal statutes across the board," while
other analysts see a return to antebellum
days or even the Articles of
Confederation.
If the critics' reaction is exaggerated,
it's largely because the impact of the
federalism revival has so far been muted
by the cases the Court has used to make
its statements about state sovereignty and
the limits on federal power. The Court has
steered clear of hot-button issues,
refraining from invalidating any popular
statute or angering the potent civil rights
constituencies most likely to force a
constitutional showdown. Only tribes
were angry when Seminole limited suits
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
Lopez and Printz, both involving federal
gun control, were decided in the halcyon
days before Littleton, when the National
Rifle Association still dominated the issue.
The usual supporters of plenary federal
authority were predictably silent when
City of Boerne struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, a favorite of
the religious right. And who ever heard of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act at issue in New York?
This term was no different. Sure,
organized labor has an interest in seeing
the FLSA enforced against state
employers, but that interest was
apparently not great enough to prompt
any amicus briefs in Alden from
traditional labor organizations. And while
elements of the business community
might be concerned about holes in patent
and trademark protection, business leaders
were noticeably silent when the College
Savings decisions came down. Compare
the muted reaction of business to the
outcry generated last month by the
disabled when the Supreme Court
interpreted the ADA to exclude
correctable impairments. No wonder the
Court sidestepped the federalism issue
raised below when it decided Olmstead v.
L.C., 67 U.S.L.W. 4567, another of this
term's ADA cases.
Observers are left to wonder whether
the Supreme Court will continue to
advance its federalism agenda, even when
that means striking down statutes
supported by politically potent groups like
the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the
National Organization for Women, and
the Sierra Club? If the Court ultimately
shrinks back from the implications of its
agenda and declines to tackle the volatile
issues at the forefront of the American
political debate, the rebirth of federalism
will have limited impact. But perhaps, the
conservative coalition on the Court is
methodically laying the groundwork for a
true federalism revolution, using
precedents that won't set off a political
counterattack until it's too late. Then
again, the pro- federalism justices may
simply be content to push their agenda up
to, but not over, the water's edge.
In the short term, feminist advocacy
groups appear most likely to disturb the
quiet march of federalism. In contrast to
the noticeable absence of traditional labor
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groups among the Alden amici, the
leading feminist advocacy groups have
been involved directly and as amici in two
high-profile cases this year that pitted
federalism against feminism. In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, 119
S. Ct. 1661 (1999), a quasi-federalism case
decided in May, the Court avoided a
showdown with feminist groups when it
ruled 5-4 that schools are liable under
Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harassment if they fail to take appropriate
measures to stop it.
On the other hand, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit, braved an
outcry from women's groups when it
struck down the civil remedy provision of
the federal Violence Against Women Act
in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (1999) (en banc).
The court held that the provision, which
allows victims of gender-motivated
violence to seek damages and other relief,
was not authorized under either the
commerce clause or the 14th
Amendment's enforcement clause.
Supreme Court watchers predict that this
enumerated powers case will reach the
Court's docket in the coming term.
Swing Vote
The importance of Davis lies primarily
in the vote of Justice O'Connor, who
wrote the majority opinion. She was
clearly the swing vote in that case,
abandoning the five-justice coalition that
prevailed in the Alden and College
Savings decisions. Her switch was all the
more notable because of the Kennedy
concurrence she joined four years earlier
in Lopez. Their concurring opinion
emphasized that "education is a traditional
concern of the States," and as such, the
Court has "a particular duty to insure that
the federal-state balance is not destroyed."
Yet caught between her commitment to
federalism and her feminist sympathies,
O'Connor sided with the latter in Davis,
making federal judges and bureaucrats the
final arbiters of what constitutes
appropriate discipline in the classroom.
Although Lopez and City of Boerne
suggest that the Supreme Court would
affirm Brzonkala, O'Connor's choice of
feminism over federalism in Davis
suggests just the opposite. Should the
Court affirm Brzonkala, it will cast grave
doubt on Congress' power to enact hate
crime statutes and send a strong signal
that the Court meant what it said in Lopez
- Congress' commerce clause authority
really is limited to those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.
Thus, Brzonkala could do for Lopez what
Alden and the College Savings cases have
done for Seminole and City of Boerne.
On the other hand, if the Court is
determined to build its federalism
jurisprudence without touching volatile
issues, it may surprise observers and
refuse to hear the case.
In the end, the outlook for federalism
depends more on future appointments
than on the Court's caseload. The survival
of the decade's modest federalism gains
may hinge on a single appointment. The
four dissenters in last month's trio of
cases--Justices John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer--can be counted on to
dismantle those gains the first chance they
get. And they will very likely get that
chance if a Democrat wins the White
House in 2000--after all, Rehnquist is 74
and O'Connor is 69.
Regardless of future appointments,
there is little doubt that Alden and College
Savings will be remembered for their
contribution to the cause of state
sovereignty and the broader federalism
agenda. And if the modest advance of
federalism in the 1990s ultimately grows
into a full-fledged constitutional
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revolution, last month's trio of decisions
may loom even larger in retrospect than
they appear today.
Curt A. Levey is director of legal and
public affairs at the Center for Individual
Rights, a nonprofit, public interest law
firm in Washington, D.C., that specializes
in civil rights, sexual harassment,
federalism, and the First Amendment.
CIR represents Tony Morrison, one of the
defendants in Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999).
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group Inc.
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STATES 3, FEDS 0 IN KEY COURT DECISIONS
Fulton County Daily Report
Wednesday, June 30, 1999
Marcia Coyle, American Lawyer News Service
WASHINGTON - Will the state of
Illinois post the Nike swoosh on
billboards along its border, welcoming
visitors with the inviting slogan: "Illinois:
Just Do It!"?
Could the state of New York seek to
soothe its surly Department of Motor
Vehicles employees by providing them
with Prozac it manufactures itself-in
violation of the corporate patent-holder's
rights?
Might the state of Maine refuse to pay
its probation officers the federally
required time and a half for overtime
work?
In each case, the answer is "no" - the
state cannot, because federal laws prohibit
such infringements of patent-holder,
trademark-holder and employee rights.
But if a reprobate state does engage in
some such illegal activity, what can the
individuals or corporations whose federal
rights are infringed do about it?
According to a trio of 5-4 decisions
the U.S. Supreme Court delivered on the
final day of its 1998-99 term, the answer
may well be: little or nothing.
The answer is definitely nothing in the
example concerning the application of
federal wage and labor laws to state-
government employers, if state employees
are seeking a monetary remedy in state
courts.
That was precisely the issue posed in
Alden v. Maine, No. 98-436. The court's
ruling: The Framers' concept of dual
sovereignty between state and federal
governments extends much further than a
strict construction of the 11th
Amendment's wording would suggest.
The concept of dual control and
autonomy is exemplified by the 11th
Amendment's grant of state sovereign
immunity, which shields states against
suits by other states' citizens.
"The Supreme Court has experienced
Y2K problems six months early and
they've returned to 1900" when it comes
to federal regulation of wages and hours,
says labor law scholar Charles Craver of
George Washington University School of
Law.
Or, other scholars suggest, to
antebellum America-given the potential
sweep of the three federalism rulings.
But are these decisions really a radical
reordering of federal-state relationships,
or are they simply another step in the
Rehnquist Court's effort to remind federal
lawmakers that the Constitution not only
grants them vast power, but limits that
power as well?
"This is a continuation of a debate
that began in the summer of 1787 and has
never been fully resolved-the debate
between a state-centered view of the
American Constitution and a nationalist
view," says constitutional law scholar and
former Solicitor General Walter Dellinger,
head of the Supreme Court practice for
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.
"The losers, favoring a states'-rights
approach, have continued to be an
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authentic voice throughout history, and at
least for now, are in the ascendancy."
Riding the Wave
The three cases arrived at the high
court on a wave of federalism that began
in 1992 with New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, where the justices held that
the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985
unconstitutionally coerced states into
administering a federal program.
Since that decision, the justices have
issued a handful of opinions striking
federal laws that, they held, exceeded
Congress' authority at the expense of the
states, including congressional attempts to
nullify states' 11th Amendment immunity
from suit in federal courts. It has been a
"structural" judicial activism, engaging a
sharply divided court in a battle over how
best to preserve the constitutional
guarantees of dual sovereignty.
The high court's three 1999 federalism
decisions turned on two of its most recent
forays into the subject. In Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the court
held that Congress lacked power under
the commerce clause of Article I (a major
source of Congress' lawmaking authority)
to abrogate a state's 11th Amendment
immunity from suit in federal court.
And in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117
S.Ct. 2365 (1997), the high court struck
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment (another major source of
congressional authority), saying that
lawmakers exceeded their power by
redefining-instead of merely enforcing-
14th Amendment religious freedom
guarantees.
The linchpin of this year's triptych
was Alden v. Maine, in which state
probation officers-locked out of federal
court by Seminole Tribe-sued in state
court to recover overtime pay allegedly
owed them by the state under the Federal
Labor Standards Act of 1938.
But the conservative high court
majority, led by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, held that the officers could not
sue in state courts. The reason: Congress
lacks the power under Article 1 of the
Constitution to subject nonconsenting
states to private suits for damages in not
only federal courts but in state courts as
well.
After a lengthy exposition of the
Constitution's structure and history, and
the high court's own federalism
precedents-disputed in an equally lengthy
dissent-Justice Kennedy explained that the
11th Amendment "confirmed rather than
established" states' immunity from suit.
State sovereign immunity preceded the
Constitution's ratification, he said, and is
"implicit in the constitutional design."
In the two other cases-both involving
a dispute between a bank and Florida over
a patented college savings plan-the high
court, led separately by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia, held that neither companies nor
individuals can sue nonconsenting states
for patent infringement or false
advertising in violation of federal law.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
No. 98-531, and College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, No. 98-149.
Relying on City of Boerne in the
patent-infringement case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said that Congress identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the
states, "let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations," that justified
using Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
in order to abrogate state immunity from
suit under the Patent Remedy Act.
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Strict Scrutiny
One outstanding question is just how
carefully the high court will review future
attempts by Congress to abrogate state
immunity with the 14th Amendment's
Section 5.
"I'd hoped when the court began
talking about the need for federal
legislation that enforces Section 5 to be
proportional to and congruent with the
problem addressed, that that was just
rhetoric and did not portend strict
scrutiny," says Professor Laurence Tribe
of Harvard Law School. "But the patent
case makes it very clear that even when
there is a 14th Amendment right at stake,
the court will scrutinize very closely
whether congressional legislation is really
necessary."
Cases the court has already accepted
for next term-involving the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Motor Vehicle Information Privacy
Act-will help answer that question, says
Professor Douglas Kmiec of Pepperdine
University School of Law.
"I don't think any constitutional right
to equality or due process is in jeopardy,
but what is open to question is whether
the expansion of protections under civil
rights statutes-beyond what the
Constitution requires-falls within
Congress' Section 5 authority, at least
insofar as authorizing private actions
against states," Kmiec says.
But even if their federalism scrutiny
turns out to be something less than strict,
the justices' rulings thus far threaten
"pernicious consequences for the
enforcement of federal statutes across the
board," Tribe warns.
That's because, he explains, the
federal government simply doesn't have
sufficient personnel to bring actions for
every violation, which is why statutes
explicitly permit private citizens to sue.
In fact, the decisions could have the
"perverse effect" of actually increasing the
federal bureaucracy, according to veteran
high court litigator and former Justice
Department official Mark Levy of
Washington's Howrey and Simon. In the
federal wage and hours arena, he explains,
"you'd have to set up a whole division
with the Department of Labor that does
nothing but monitor the states."
Scholars and litigators say the recent
decisions endanger the private
enforcement of rights under such federal
laws as the Violence Against Women Act,
the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act and
perhaps federal copyright laws.
But Thomas E. Baker, director of the
Constitutional Law Resource Center at
Drake University Law School, believes
that the court's concern for its own
institutional authority will limit its tilt
toward the states.
"My instinct is they would back off
before there was a kind of constitutional
showdown, having learned the lesson of
the Lochner era debacle when the court
thwarted state regulation of business," he
says. "They feel a sense of institutional
loyalty not to go so far out that they bring
harm to the Supreme Court as an
institution."
Indeed, despite the fact that they are
blocking the courthouse to individuals and
companies seeking monetary damages
from states for violations of federal law,
the majority did note that other means
remain in place for making recalcitrant
states follow federal obligations that are
imposed on them by the existence of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
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There Is Help Out There
Private businesses and individuals can
seek injunctive and declaratory relief to
terminate state violations of their federal
rights, and the federal government itself
can sue in state courts on behalf of
wronged plaintiffs and can employ the
power of the purse, conditioning funding
of state programs on the states'
relinquishing their immunity.
Even in the patent area, there is hope
for meaningful recourse, says Bruce
Wexler of New York's Fitzpatrick, Cella,
Harper & Scinto. He explains that "the
opinion puts some pressure on states to
have an available forum for infringement
claims and remedies, or else we'll be back
in Congress showing a deprivation of due
process."
Just how long the court's states' rights
efforts will last may well depend on the
longevity of its proponents. The
federalism decisions tend to be 5-4, with
the dissenters explicitly expressing a
refusal to consent to their defeat in an
area that has proven historically volatile.
"Is this still in flux? That all depends
on the American electorate in November
2000," says Yale Law School Professor
Akhil Reed Amar.
Whatever the ultimate fate of the
federalism rulings, says former Solicitor
General Dellinger, the decisions deserve
to be seen as "the capstone of the
Rehnquist Court.
"Although he lost the battle in
National League of Cities exempting state
governments from federal regulation, the
position he set out as associate justice has
effectively come to be the law," Dellinger
says. "That makes him, more than anyone
else, responsible for one of the three or
four major shifts in constitutionalism
we've seen in two centuries of American
history."
Copyright © 1999 American Lawyer
Media, L.P.
130
CIVIL WARS
Supreme Court Puts States First
Legal Times
Monday, June 28,1999
Jenna Greene
The increasingly dicey balance of legal
authority between the federal and state
governments got a jolt last week. The
Supreme Court issued three decisions on
June 23 curbing congressional power. The
votes in each case were 5-4. In one of the
cases, Alden v. Maine, the majority ruled
against 64 Maine parole and probation
officers who had been denied overtime
and had sued under the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, a 1938 statute meant to
apply uniform wage laws throughout the
nation. The opinion--coming as just the
latest and perhaps most forceful statement
in a string of Supreme Court rulings in
recent years reining in Congress and the
power of Washington--will likely
reverberate for years. Below is a roundup
of commentary on the case and its
meaning, reported by Legal Times staff
reporter Jenna Greene, as well as excerpts
from the decision.
Tim Masanz
Group Director for Economic Policy and
Commerce, National Governors'
Association
"The important thing to note is the
difference between monetary and
injunctive relief. The court is simply
saying states are immune from suits for
monetary damages. States are not free
from having to comply with federal law.
What they are immune from is suits that
threaten their sovereign immunity, and
those are damage suits."
Statement by Robert Scully
Executive Director, National Association
of Police Organizations Inc.
"State employees throughout the
United States, including law enforcement
officers, will be denied any remedy to
vindicate their rights under the Fair Labor
Standards Act or any other Federal statute
enacted under Congress' Article 1 powers,
laws which usually protect workers or
members of the public. Now the
Supreme Court is willing to sacrifice the
officers' rights on the altar of a glorified
and exulted version of States Rights.' The
ability of states to nullify Federal laws by
refusing to enforce them, an issue prior to
the Civil War and during desegregation in
the 1950s and 1960s, is once again at the
forefront."
Charles Tiefer
Acting Counsel, House of
Representatives, 1993-94; Associate
Professor, University of Baltimore Law
School
"The Alden decision makes the U.S.
sound more like the European
Community, with a weak overall higher
government and the states as sovereign as
France or Germany. The decision
threatens statutes like the qui tam portion
of the False Claims Act, where the federal
government creates causes of action to
keep the states from defrauding the
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Treasury. States like to get hundreds of
billions of dollars of federal tax money
without accountability. Justice Kennedy
might find immunity for states from
accountability for fraud."
Richard Parker
Professor, Harvard Law School
"It seems to me the dismayed reaction
to the opinion is characteristic of the
inflated, hysterical alarmism typical of our
legal culture. Everything depends for us
lawyers not on what a particular decision
actually decides, which in this case is not
much, but what direction the court is
going, which is yet to be determined. It's
the typical bias of the media. Since the
majority is conservative, the media adopts
the dissent's description of what the
majority did. It's disgraceful. I got a call
yesterday from the editor of a children's
magazine who was doing a story on how
this decision will allow child labor."
Brian Wolfman
Staff Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation
Group
"If a law cannot be enforced against a
state as an employer in any court, state or
federal, it loses its deterrent effect.
Regardless of what you think about the
historical underpinnings of the decision,
the practical responses from the majority
are, one, states will obey the law anyway,
and, two, the federal government can do
the enforcement job on its own. Both
responses utterly overlook the purpose of
the enforcement mechanism to begin
with, which is compensation and
deterrence, and the acknowledgement that
private enforcement is needed because the
federal government cannot do it all on its
own, because the job is far too big."
Department of Labor Official,
Speaking on Condition of Anonymity
"The general scheme for many laws is
to allow for enforcement by both the
department and private parties. This
decision carves out an exception for state
employees, leaving them without a private
remedy and putting extra enforcement
responsibility on the Department of
Labor."
Paul Rothstein
Professor of Law, Georgetown University
"This will reinvigorate the utility of
state laws because people can still sue
states in state court under state law. In the
past, state legislators have said, Why pass
laws in areas like food and drug and
antitrust and environment? Federal law
sweeps the field.' Now it's important they
pass these laws or expressly waive
sovereign immunity so state courts can be
used to enforce federal laws against the
state government."
Ray Aragon
Litigation Partner, McKenna & Cuneo
"The Alden decision continues the
Court's recent trend of placing sharp
limits on the ability of Congress to make
laws binding on the states. That trend
became very clear with the Court's
rejection of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act in 1995 in United States v. Lopez, and
became even more pronounced in the
Seminole Tribe and Printz cases. For the
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first time since the New Deal, these recent
decisions place real limits on the right of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
The 10th Amendment, which for
most of its history has been a
constitutional curiosity, is now a powerful,
if uncertain, brake on federal authority.
Alden, which depends on novel
interpretations of the 11th and 10th
Amendments, continues this trend into a
new and uncertain area. Alden and the
Court's other recent federalism decisions
challenge Congress to make laws with a
new federalist vision in mind. In the view
of the Court's current conservative
majority, the federal government is not
the only sovereign in town. Congress
doesn't have the states to kick around
anymore."
Congress' Power Is Limited
"This case at one level concerns the
formal structure of federalism, but in a
Constitution as resilient as ours form
mirrors substance. Congress has vast
power but not all power. When Congress
legislates in matters affecting the States, it
may not treat these sovereign entities as
mere prefectures or corporations.
Congress must accord States the esteem
due to them as joint participants in a
federal system, one beginning with the
premise of sovereignty in both the central
Government and the separate States.
Congress has ample means to ensure
compliance with valid federal laws, but it
must respect the sovereignty of the States.
Although the Constitution begins with
the principle that sovereignty rests with
the people, it does not follow that the
National Government becomes the
ultimate, preferred mechanism for
expressing the people's will. The States
exist as a refutation of that concept....
The Framers of the Constitution did not
share our dissenting colleagues' belief that
the Congress may circumvent the federal
design by regulating the States directly
when it pleases to do so, including by a
proxy in which individual citizens are
authorized to levy upon the state
treasuries absent the States' consent to
jurisdiction....
The State of Maine has not questioned
Congress' power to prescribe substantive
rules of federal law to which it must
comply.... The Solicitor General of the
United States has appeared before this
Court, however, and asserted that the
federal interest in compensating the
States' employees for alleged past
violations of federal law is so compelling
that the sovereign State of Maine must be
stripped of its immunity and subjected to
suit in its own courts by its own
employees. Yet, despite specific statutory
authorization, the United States
apparently found the same interests
insufficient to justify sending even a single
attorney to Maine to prosecute this
litigation. The difference between a suit by
the United States on behalf of the
employees and a suit by the employees
implicates a rule that the National
Government must itself deem the case of
sufficient importance to take action
against the State; and history, precedent,
and the structure of the Constitution
make clear that, under the plan of the
Convention, the States have consented to
suits of the first kind but not of the
second."
- Justice Anthony Kennedy, for the Court
Rights Require Remedies
"The sequence of the Court's
positions prompts a suspicion of error,
and skepticism is confirmed by scrutiny of
the Court's efforts to justify its holding.
There is no evidence that the Tenth
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Amendment constitutionalized a concept
of sovereign immunity as inherent in the
notion of statehood, and no evidence that
any concept of inherent sovereign
immunity was understood historically to
apply when the sovereign sued was not
the font of the law. . . . The Court's
federalism ignores the accepted authority
of Congress to bind States under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and to
provide for enforcement of federal rights
in state court. The Court's history simply
disparages the capacity of the Constitution
to order relationships in a Republic that
has changed since the founding.
On each point the Court has raised it
is rmstaken, and I respectfully dissent
from its judgment.
Unless Congress plans a significant
expansion of the National Government's
litigating forces to provide a lawyer
whenever private litigation is barred by
today's decision and Seminole Tribe, the
allusion to enforcement of private rights
by the National Government is probably
not much more than whimsy. ...
The point is not that difficulties of
enforcement should drive the Court's
decision, but simply that where Congress
has created a private right to damages, it is
implausible to claim that enforcement by a
public authority without any incentive
beyond its general enforcement power will
ever afford the private right a traditionally
adequate remedy. ...
So there is much irony in the Court's
profession that it grounds its opinion on a
deeply rooted historical tradition of
sovereign immunity, when the Court
abandons a principle nearly as inveterate,
and much closer to the hearts of the
Framers: That where there is a right, there
must be a remedy."
- Justice David Souter, for the dissenters
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group Inc.
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KIMEL v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS
&
UNITED STATES v. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS
The States Take on Congress - Again
Matthew Frey *
The Supreme Court will hear arguments this term in related cases that will test whether
Congress may hold states responsible for violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), a federal law passed in 1967 aimed at safeguarding the rights of
older workers. Because it will examine Congress's power over states under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court's ruling in this case may prove one of the Supreme Court's most
important opinions yet concerning federalism, the Constitutional balance of state and federal
power, an issue that has taken center stage in the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence.
The cases before the Court arise out of a suit filed by 35 former faculty members at two
Florida public universities. The plaintiffs claimed that the universities fired them in violation
of ADEA guidelines. Florida defended itself in part by arguing that it was immune to the
plaintiffs' suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state from being sued in
federal court by private citizens without its consent. The discharged faculty countered with
the assertion that, in passing the ADEA, Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suits by private citizens alleging ADEA violations. The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that "nothing in the ADEA indicates
a truly clear intent by Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity."
"No unequivocal expression of an intent to abrogate immunity is unmistakably clear in
the ADEA," Judge J. L. Edmondson further wrote for the court. "No reference to the
Eleventh Amendment or to States' sovereign immunity is included. Nor is there, in one
place, a plain, declaratory statement that States can be sued by individuals in federal court."
Instead, the court noted, one was forced to piece together Congress' intent from a
patchwork of sections within the law, and this fell far short of the clarity required. "For
abrogation to be unmistakably clear," the court held, "it should not first be necessary to fit
together various sections of the statute to create an expression from which one might infer
an intent to abrogate."
The court went on to reject the argument that Congress, in a 1974 amendment to the
ADEA, made plain its intent to abrogate states' immunity by classifying states as employers
subject to lawsuit. "To include the States as employers under the ADEA . .. does not show
an intent that the States be sued by private citizens in federal court," Judge Edmonson
wrote. In fact, the court noted, Congress may very well have had other means of redress in
mind. "The ADEA is enforceable against the States, despite sovereign immunity, through
forms of relief other than direct suits by citizens in federal court. . . . Congress may have
had these other forms of enforcement in mind when it amended the statute to include States
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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as employers." The court concluded that engaging in such speculation merely reinforced the
view that the amendment to the ADEA also lacked a statement of clear congressional intent.
The Supreme Court, in deciding this case, will be heavily influenced by its opinions in
Alden v. Maine, College Savings Bank v. Florida, and Florida v. College Savings Bank, the
trio of federalism decisions it issued late last term. In particular, in Alden the Court held that
Congress did not have authority pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce to
hold states liable under the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) for their failure to pay
workers overtime. The Court held that state governments, prior to the ratification of the
Constitution, enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit, and that the Constitution did not
abrogate this immunity. Thus, the Court concluded, the State of Maine could not be sued
under the FLSA unless Maine had specifically waived its sovereign immunity, which it had
not.
Kimel, however, presents a different issue. In this case, the Court will need to decide
whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, constituted a limited
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity and, if so, whether the ADEA was enacted
pursuant to Section 5. Section 5 grants Congress the authority to pass legislation intended to
enforce the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Section 1 provision
that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.
In Kimel, the Court will need to determine whether Congress promulgated the ADEA
pursuant to its Section 5 power and, if so, whether the prohibition of age discrimination is a
proper exercise of that power. This will lead the Court into an analysis of age discrimination,
with the aim of deciding whether protection against age discrimination is a proper concern
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Were the Court to strike down the ADEA on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, it would
represent an exclamation point at the end of a long history of federalism jurisprudence in the
twentieth century.
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98-791 Kimel v. Fla. Board of Regents
Ruling below (11 Cir., 139 F.3d 1426, 66 U.S.L.W. 1679, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1201):
Age Discrimination in Employment Act provision adding states to definition of "employer"
does not abrogate states' 11* Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
Question presented: Does 11 Amendment bar private suit in federal court against state
for violation of ADEA?
98-796 United States v. Fla. Board of Regents
Ruling below (11 Cir., 139 F.3d 1426, 66 U.S.L.W. 1679, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1201):
Age Discrimination in Employment Act provision adding states to definition of "employer"
does not abrogate states' 11 hAmendment immunity from suit in federal court.
Questions presented: (1) Does ADEA contain clear abrogation of states' 11 hAmendment
immunity from suit by individuals? (2) Was extension of ADEA to states proper exercise of
Congress's power under Section 5 of 14t Amendment, thereby constituting valid exercise of
congressional power to abrogate states' 1 1 Amendment immunity from suit by individuals?
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J. Daniel KIMEL, et a., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided April 30, 1998
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge.
Three cases presenting the same or
similar issues of Eleventh Amendment
immunity were consolidated and are
addressed in this appeal. In all three
cases, the States, or their agencies,
submitted motions to dismiss based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
issues in this appeal are whether Congress
abrogated States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity for suits under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA").
Discussion
The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity
commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
This provision not only prohibits suits
against States in federal court by citizens
of other States, but also prohibits suits
brought against a State in federal court by
its own citizens. * * *
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida ** *, the Supreme Court recently
considered the issue of when Congress
can properly abrogate States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Court's
decision in Seminole overruled
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. *
which held that acts taken by Congress
pursuant to the Commerce Clause could,
if sufficiently clear, abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In Seminole, the
Court specifically held that Congress had
no authority to abrogate State sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment when Congress acted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause; the
power to abrogate only exists under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
* * In addition, the Court set out
precisely what Congress must do to
abrogate the States' immunity.
Two requirements must be satisfied
before Eleventh Amendment
immunity can be successfully
abrogated by Congress. * * * First,
Congress must have intended to
abrogate that immunity by providing
"a clear legislative statement" of its
intent-"making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute." * * * Second,
Congress must have attempted to
abrogate this immunity under
proper constitutional authority. In
other words, Congress must have
enacted the statute at issue using its
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Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5,
enforcement powers. * * *
I. Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967
Although I believe good reason exists
to doubt that the ADEA was (or could
have been properly) enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, I will not
decide that question today; * * * questions
of constitutional power should be decided
only as a last resort. Instead, I focus on
the ADEA's words and rest my decision
on the lack of unmistakably clear
legislative intent.
In searching the ADEA for an
unequivocal statement of intent to
abrogate, courts look only to the language
of the statute itself. * * * A court's guess
about Congress's political will and
subjective intentions-past, present, or
future-is without consequence; only the
statute and its language are to be
considered. As directed by the Supreme
Court, I do not go beyond the text of the
ADEA in deciding whether it contains the
requisite, unmistakably clear statement of
intent to abrogate.
This requirement-that the intent to
abrogate be found in an unmistakably
clear statement in the language of the
statute-necessitates a high level of clarity
by Congress. But, as the Supreme Court
has observed, such a requirement of
Congress is not too high when
considering the important interests
protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment recognizes that
States, as a matter of constitutional law,
are special entities-still possessing
attributes of sovereignty. The
Amendment strikes a balance between the
federal government and the States. To
alter that balance, Congress must be
unmistakably clear in its intent. * * *
No unequivocal expression of an
intent to abrogate immunity is
unmistakably clear in the ADEA. No
reference to the Eleventh Amendment or
to States' sovereign immunity is included.
Nor is there, in one place, a plain,
declaratory statement that States can be
sued by individuals in federal court. To
me, an intent on the part of Congress to
abrogate the States' constitutional right to
immunity is not sufficiently clear to be
effective under Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. * * *
In one section, 29 U.S.C. § 630, the
ADEA defines employers to include
States. In a different section, 29 U.S.C. §
626(b), which never mentions employers
much less mentions States as defendants,
the ADEA separately provides for
enforcement by means of suits for legal or
equitable relief in courts of competent
jurisdiction. This statutory structure does
not provide the clarity needed to abrogate
States' constitutional right to sovereign
immunity. For abrogation to be
unmistakably clear, it should not first be
necessary to fit together various sections
of the statute to create an expression from
which one might infer an intent to
abrogate. Although we make no definite
rule about it, the need to construe one
section with another, by its very nature,
hints that no unmistakable or unequivocal
declaration is present. More important,
when we do construe the various ADEA
sections together, abrogation never
becomes "as clear as is the summer's
sun." * * *
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Still, Plaintiffs argue, and all three
district courts seemed to agree, that
Congress's amendments to the ADEA in
1974-adding States, their agencies, and
political subdivisions to the definition of
"employer" (along with the original
portions of the ADEA providing that the
statute may be enforced in courts of
competent jurisdiction)-represents the
unmistakably clear legislative statement
required to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. This view (which is
opposed by the State in Dickson) seems to
clash with the Supreme Court's
precedents.
In Employees of the Dep't of Public
Health and Welfare v. Missouri * * *, the
Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") did not provide a
sufficiently clear statement of intent to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. As
initially enacted, the FLSA (like the
ADEA) did not apply at all to States. In
1966, the FLSA was amended to include
certain State agencies in the definition of
employer. This amendment, the Court
held, did not provide the clear statement
of intent to abrogate immunity, despite
the provisions allowing suits in courts of
"competent jurisdiction" against
employers who violated the FLSA. ***
"The history and tradition of the Eleventh
Amendment indicate that by reason of
that barrier a federal court is not
competent to render judgment against a
nonconsenting State." * * * Like the
ADEA, there was no dispute that the
FLSA applied to the State agencies set out
in the FLSA; the dispute was only about
what kinds of enforcement were available
when dealing with States as
defendant-employers.
In a later decision, Dellmuth v. Muth,
the Supreme Court held that the
Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA) did not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity despite provisions
allowing suit in federal district court and
many provisions referring to the States as
parties in suits of enforcement. * * *
That the pertinent statute (like the
ADEA) never mentioned either "the
Eleventh Amendment or the States'
sovereign immunity" was given weight.
* * * Abrogation was not sufficiently
clear. * * *
To include the States as employers
under the ADEA, as in the FLSA, does
not show an intent that the States be sued
by private citizens in federal court-the
kind of suit prohibited under the Eleventh
Amendment. * * * The ADEA is
enforceable against the States, despite
sovereign immunity, through forms of
relief other than direct suits by citizens in
federal court. * * * Congress may have
had these other forms of enforcement in
mind when it amended the statute to
include States as employers. Thus, the
general application of the law to the States
does not make the requisite clear
statement that Congress also intended the
ADEA to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment specifically.
I do not dispute that some provisions
of the ADEA make States look like
possible defendants in suits alleging
violations of the ADEA. I accept that
these provisions could support an
"inference that the States were intended to
be subject to damages actions for
violations of the [ADEA]." * * * But, as
the Supreme Court stressed in Dellmuth, a
permissible inference is not "the
unequivocal declaration" that is required
to show Congress's intent to exercise its
powers of abrogation. * * *
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I conclude that nothing in the ADEA
indicates a truly clear intent by Congress
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity and, thus, States are entitled to
immunity from suits by private citizens in
federal court under the ADEA.
II. Americans With Disabilities Act
In sharp contrast to the ADEA, the
ADA does include a clear statement of
intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity: "A State shall not be immune
under the eleventh amendment. . ." * * *
Thus, the only argument that Eleventh
Amendment immunity still exists is that
the ADA was not enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. We are not
persuaded by this argument.
Unlike the ADEA, it is plain that
Congress was invoking its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers when it
enacted the ADA. *** Congress
specifically found that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment."
* * * We accept Congress's analysis of the
situation addressed by the ADA and agree
with the courts that have addressed the
issue: the ADA was properly enacted
under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers.
Conclusion
The Eleventh Amendment is an
important part of the Constitution. It
stands for the constitutional principle that
State sovereign immunity limits the federal
courts' jurisdiction under Article III. As
such, Congress must make an
unmistakably clear statement of its intent
before a federal court can accept that
States have been stripped of their
constitutionally granted sovereign
immunity. For me, the ADEA contains
no unequivocally clear statement of such
intent. The ADA does. And the ADA
was enacted under the authority of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
For the reasons stated in our
combined opinions, we hold that the
ADEA does not abrogate States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity but that the ADA
does do so. Therefore, in Kmel, we
REVERSE and REMAND for dismissal.
In Dickson, we AFFIRM in part and
REVERSE in part and REMAND for
further proceedings. In MacPherson, we
AFFIRM the district court's decision.
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COURTS TO DECIDE STATE IMMUNITY, CAMPAIGN REFORM,
PRIVACY ISSUES
The Legal Intel@encer
January 26, 1999 Tuesday
Richard Carel, Associated Press
WASHINGTON - Entering a titanic
constitutional struggle between Congress
and the states, the Supreme Court
yesterday agreed to decide whether state
employees who say they are victims of age
discrimination can make a federal case of
it.
At issue is whether a federal anti-bias
law, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, wiped out the
11th Amendment immunity states and
state agencies enjoy against being sued in
federal courts. The justices set the stage
for an important ruling, probably
sometime in 2000, as it granted a Clinton
administration appeal stemming from
three separate disputes in Florida and
Alabama. Ruling on those three cases in
one decision, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals said the 1967 law cannot be
invoked in federal lawsuits against states
or state agencies. In that same ruling, the
appeals court said states and their agencies
could be forced to defend themselves
against federal lawsuits involving another
anti-bias law, the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Florida officials appealed
from that aspect of the 11th Circuit
court's ruling, but the justices took no
action on the state's appeal yesterday. In a
decision two years ago, the court said
Congress may wipe out a state's 11th
Amendment immunity only when it is
going after some specific discriminatory
harm and when it unequivocally says it is
targeting that immunity. In the
government appeal acted on yesterday,
Justice Department lawyers noted that
federal appeals courts are split in deciding
whether to allow lawsuits under the age-
discrimination act against the states in
federal courts. Two have disallowed them;
five have not. The cases are Kimel v
Florida Board of Regents, 98-791, and
U.S. v. Florida Board of Regents, 98-796.
Campaign Finance Laws
The court also set the stage yesterday
for a significant campaign-finance ruling
as it agreed to consider reviving Missouri's
restrictions on contributions to political
candidates. The justices said they will
review a ruling that struck down the
money limits as free-speech violations. In
their appeal, state officials contend that
the limits deter "efforts to pollute the
political process." "There is a real fear,
which may be stronger yesterday than at
any time in recent memory, that money is
harmfully distorting the nation's political
process," the state's appeal contended.
"There is strong political pressure on
legislators at all levels of government to
adopt restrictions." A 1994 Missouri law
set limits on the contributions people can
make to candidates. Those limits were
enforced in 1996 and 1998 elections until
the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
blocked future enforcement in its decision
Nov. 30. A political action committee,
Shrink Missouri Government, had
challenged the limits early last year but a
federal judge upheld them. A three-judge
panel of the 8th Circuit court voted 2-1 to
reverse the judge's ruling after concluding
that the state's interest in preventing
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corruption did not justify the "such a
heavy-handed restriction of protected
speech. "The case acted on yesterday is
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 98-963.
Sale of Police Records
Also yesterday, the high court agreed
to decide whether states may block release
of police records and other government
documents to those who would sell the
information even when the records
routinely are released to the news media
and others. The justices said they will
review rulings that struck down such a
California law as a violation of
commercial free-speech rights. Elsewhere
around the country, courts have reached
conflicting rulings on the legitimacy of
laws aimed at protecting the privacy of
people arrested by police. California
lawmakers amended the state's public
records law in 1996 to limit the release of
information on arrested suspects and
crime victims to those with "a scholarly,
journalistic, political or governmental
purpose or . .. a licensed private
investigator." Anyone given such records
had to certify that the information would
"not be used directly or indirectly to sell a
product or service." Union Reporting
Publishing Corp., which had sold lists of
names and addresses of arrested people to
lawyers, insurance companies and driving
schools, sued the Los Angeles Police
Department over its enforcement of the
law. The case is Los Angeles Police
Department v. Union Reporting
Publishing, 98-678.
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Media
143
COURTS STRUGGLE WITH IMMUNITY ISSUES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUITS
New York Law Journal
Volume 221, Number 101
Thursday, May 27, 1999
Robert P. Lewis
TWO NEW YORK federal courts
recently issued conflicting opinions
concerning one of the most vexing issues in
employment law-whether states are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment
from federal statutory employment
discrimination claims brought in federal
court.'
In three consolidated cases, Cooper v.
New York State Office of Mental Health,
Mete v. New York State Office of Mental
Retardation; and Davis v. Board of Trustees
of the University of Connecticut
(collectively, the Cooper cases), the Second
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that
states are not immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from federal court actions
alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
By contrast, in Kilcullen v. New York
State Department of Transportation, a
federal district judge in the Northern
District of New York held that states are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment
from federal court actions alleging violations
of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
Moreover, both courts recognized that
their decisions conflict with those of other
' The 11th Amendment provides: The
Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
courts. For example, in the Cooper cases,
the Second Circuit expressly disagreed
with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents
and the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Humenansky v. Regents of University
of Minnesota, both of which held that
states do have immunity from ADEA.
actions in federal court. Similarly, in
Kilcullen, the court expressly disagreed
not only with decisions from several
other circuits, but with a decision
recently issued by another judge in the
Northern District of New York.
These conflicting opinions highlight
a long-simmering split in the courts over
states' immunity from federal
employment discrimination suits. Like
so many other issues arising under the
federal employment discrimination
statutes, state agencies and their
employees will have to wait until the
Supreme Court settles these issues
before they can be certain that their
discrimination action can be brought in
federal court. Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in the
Kimel case, which will be heard during
the Court's next term.
The stakes are extremely high. In
Alden v. State, also set for Supreme
Court review, Maine's Supreme Judicial
Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment immunizes states from
suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act
in state court as well as federal court.
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Consequently, if the Supreme Court
upholds Alden and Kimel, thus ejecting the
Second Circuit's opinion in the Cooper
cases, then aggrieved state employees will
find themselves stranded in a twilight zone
in which they are barred from asserting their
federal statutory rights in any court.
Basis of 1mmunity
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
the Supreme Court held that Congress may
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, but only where it: (1)
unequivocally expresses its intent to
abrogate immunity and (2) acts pursuant to
a valid exercise of its power. To satisfy the
first requirement, Congress's intent must be
obvious from a "clear legislative statement."
To satisfy the second requirement, Congress
must act pursuant to the power vested in it
under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Cooper cases, the Second Circuit
found that the ADEA met the first prong of
the Seminole Tribe test. The court found the
requisite "unequivocal expression" of
Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity in a 1974
Amendment to the ADEA that extended its
scope by adding "a State or political
subdivision of a State and any agency or
instrumentality of a State" to the definition
of a covered "employer" and by adding
"employees subject to civil service laws of a
State government" to the definition of
''employee."
In Kimel, the Eleventh Circuit focused
on the absence, in the ADEA, of any
express reference to the Eleventh
Amendment or of a declaratory statement
that states can be sued in federal court. In
Humenansky, the Eighth Circuit focused on
the ADEA's enforcement mechanism, set
forth in 29 U.S.C. §626(b) and (c), which
authorizes aggrieved persons to sue "in any
court of competent jurisdiction," and
which provides that the ADEA "shall
be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in" the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Among the cross-referenced FLSA
enforcement statutes is 29 U.S.C.
§216(b), which authorizes aggrieved
employees to sue for damages "in any
Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction."
The Eighth Circuit found the
ADEA's cross-reference to the FLSA's
enforcement mechanism to be decisive.
The court explained that, as originally
enacted, neither the FLSA nor the
ADEA included states in its definitions
of covered employers. In 1966,
Congress amended the FLSA definition
to include certain state employers. The
Supreme Court, however, in Employees
of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare
v. Missouri, held that the amendment
did not evidence sufficiently clear intent
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity because Congress did not
enact a corresponding amendment to
the FLSA's aforementioned
enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C.
§216(b), expressly allowing those state
employers to be sued in federal court.
Congress responded in 1974 by
amending 29 U.S.C. §216(b) to permit
actions "against any employer
(including a public agency) in any
Federal or State Court of competent
jurisdiction." Many courts have held
this to evidence Congress's
unmistakably clear intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the FLSA.
At the same time that Congress
amended 29 U.S.C. §216(b) of the FLSA
in 1974, it enacted the aforementioned
amendment to the ADEA's definition
of "employer" to include states. Because
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29 U.S.C. §626(b) incorporates 29 U.S.C.
§216(b), the 1974 Amendments amended
part of the ADEA enforcement mechanism.
Congress, however, did not amend the
other prong of the ADEA enforcement
mechanism, 29 U.S.C. 56 26(c), which still
contains only a general authorization to
enforce the ADEA "in any court of
competent jurisdiction."
The result, noted the Eighth Circuit,
was that the 1974 ADEA Amendments
could be viewed as virtually identical to the
1966 FLSA Amendment that the Supreme
Court, in the Employers opinion, found to
be insufficient evidence of Congress's intent
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
because they did not expressly provide that
state employers could be sued in federal
court.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit held,
Congress's failure to amend the ADEA's
enforcement mechanism was evidence
either (1) that Congress did not intend to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the ADEA or (2) of Congressional
oversight. The court concluded that,
because legislative oversight could not
possibly constitute the requisite
"unequivocal expression" of an intent to
abrogate, states were immune from ADEA
suits in federal court.
The Second Circuit, in the Cooper
decisions, disagreed with the Eighth
Circuit's analysis. It held that the 1974
amendments to the ADEA were sufficiently
explicit to evidence Congress's intent to
abrogate immunity. The court distinguished
the ADEA from the version of the FLSA
considered by the Supreme Court in
Employers on the grounds that the FLSA
defined "employers" to exclude "any State
or political subdivision of a state" except for
certain state-run hospitals and schools. The
court found this to be a sufficient
demonstration of Congressional hesitancy
to subject states to FLSA coverage to
conclude that it could not be assumed
that Congress intended to subject states
to the FLSA's enforcement mechanisms
without explicit guidance in the text of
the FLSA.
Unlike the FLSA, noted the Second
Circuit, the ADEA does not exclude
certain state employees from its
coverage. Instead, the ADEA explicitly
includes states and their employees
within its scope by naming them-
without limitation-in its definitions of
"employer" and "employee,"
respectively.
The Second Circuit, in the Cooper
cases, held that the ADEA satisfied the
second prong of the Seminole Tribe test-
that Congress validly exercised its power
under the Equal Protection Clause in
enacting it. By contrast, the Northern
District Court, in the Kilcullen case, held
that the ADA did not satisfy the second
prong.
Both cases analyzed the second
prong under the test recently enunciated
by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne
v. Flores, in which the Court held that,
for a statute to be properly remedial (as
is proper under the Equal Protection
Clause) rather than substantive (which is
not), there must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury
prevented or remedied and the means
adopted by Congress to that end.
In the Cooper cases, the Second
Circuit, citing the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Ill., held that the ADEA was
a proper exercise of Congress's power
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Noting that the Supreme Court, in two
prior cases, Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia and Vance v.
Bradley, refused to recognize age as a
suspect classification entitled to strict
scrutiny by the courts, the court
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nevertheless found the ADEA to be a
proper exercise of Congress's power under
the Equal Protection Clause because the
clause grants to Congress the power to
legislate a stricter standard of conduct than
the Supreme Court has. In fact, the Second
Circuit found support for its holding in
Muria and Bradle, holding that, because the
Supreme Court determined the standard of
review applicable to the alleged violations
and addressing the merits of the allegations
rather than dismissing the suits as beyond
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court conceded sub silento that the
Equal Protection Clause protects against age
discrimination.
The Second Circuit's decision in the
Cooper cases expressly disagreed with
Humenansky and Kimel on this point. Those
courts held that, because the Supreme
Court, in Murgia and Bradly, as well as in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, held that certain
mandatory retirement policies were lawful
because they had a rational relation to
legitimate governmental interests, and thus
refused to recognize age as a suspect class
entitled to a heightened level of equal
protection scrutiny, the ADEA, which
subject all age-based employment decisions
to a suspect classification test, provides
more protection than does the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, concluded those
courts, Congress improperly determined the
substance of the constitutional rights of the
elderly.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Kimel, also held
that the ADEA failed the City ofBoerne test
because there was no congruence or
proportionality between the injury
prevented or remedied and the means
adopted by Congress to that end. The court
noted that Congress amended the ADEA to
subject states to its provisions not for any
concern for the Constitution, but because
its supporters "simply thought it was a good
idea."
ADA Immunity
In Kilcullen, the court's analysis of
the first prong of the Seminole Tribe test
was much simpler because, unlike the
ADEA, the ADA contains a clear
expression of Congress's intent. The
ADA provides that a "state shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution of the United States
from an action in Federal or State court
of competent jurisdiction for a violation
of this chapter."
With respect to the second Seminole
Tribe prong, however, the court,
agreeing with a minority of courts,
including the Eighth Circuit in Kimel
(which also dealt with the ADA), held
that the ADA is an invalid exercise of
Congress's power under the Equal
Protection Clause because the ADA
(like the ADEA, according to Kime),
provides more protection than does the
Equal Protection Clause. Consequently,
the court held, in enacting the ADA,
Congress improperly defined the
substance of the Constitutional rights of
the disabled.
The court based its holding on the
Supreme Court's opinion in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., which
held that state action involving mental
disabilities should be reviewed under a
rational basis test rather under than
under a strict scrutiny standard, and on
subsequent decisions in Coolbaugh v.
State of Louisiana and Lussier v.
Dugger, applying City of Cleburne to
both physical and mental disabilities.
The court also held that the ADA
failed to satisfy the City of Boerne test
because the ADA is not a congruent
and proportional response to violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court focused on the ADA's prohibition
against failing to make "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical
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or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability ...
unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship . . . ." The court held that,
because a disabled person needing
accommodation imposes costs on
employers which are not attendant to
employment of non-disabled persons, and
because a government has a legitimate
interest in performing its functions in a
cost-efficient manner, a state's decision not
to accommodate is rationally related to its
legitimate interest in cost-efficiency.
Because the failure to accommodate
survives a rational basis review, there is no
significant likelihood evident that the
accommodation requirement will prevent or
remedy many instances of unconstitutional
behavior. Thus, on its face, the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement was
not a congruent and proportional response
to unconstitutional discrimination under
Boerne. Instead, held the court, the ADA's
imposition of an entitlement to reasonable
accommodation created a new substantive
right outside the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The court also based its finding on the
lack of evidence in the legislative history of
the ADA from which Congress could have
reason to believe that the failure to
accommodate, though facially
constitutional, was unconstitutional in
practice. According to the court, this
required evidence from which Congress
could have reason to believe that the
failure to accommodate will often have
no rational relation to any legitimate
purpose, which evidence did not exist in
the record.
Conclusion
The case law clearly indicates that
both federal and state courts, including
New York's courts, are struggling to
define the scope of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from federal
employment discrimination suits. At
some point during its upcoming term,
the Supreme Court will provide
guidance, in Kimel in connection with
Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the ADEA, and in Alden, as to whether
Eleventh Amendment immunity
extends to suits filed in state courts as
well as federal courts.
Until then, the ability of
employment attorneys and their clients
to litigate their employment
discrimination claims in federal and state
court will depend largely on the federal
circuit or state in which they reside.
Robert P. Lewis leads the employment
and labor law practice in Baker &
McKenzie's New York Office.
Copyright C 1999 NLP IP Company
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RENO v. CONDON
Will Diver Privacy Take a Back Seat to States' Rights?
Matthew Frey *
Do you care who sees your State motor vehicle records? The federal government does,
and it's taking its case to the Supreme Court.
The United States will this term appeal a Fourth Circuit ruling issued last September that
blocked federal authorities from enforcing the Driver Privacy Protection Act (DPPA). No
doubt adding to its other high-profile rulings this decade concerning federalism, the Court in
this case will determine whether the federal government may regulate state policies regarding
the disclosure of driver information.
Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994 in response to widespread concern over lax control
of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records. Legislative testimony
revealed that as many as 34 states allowed easy access to personal driver information and
that in some cases, such as the 1989 killing of actress Rebecca Shaeffer, criminals had
targeted their victims based on information gleaned from the victim's driver information
records. Congress also found alarming the common state practice of selling or releasing
driver information to companies for use in direct-marketing campaigns.
In striking down the DPPA, the Fourth Circuit, in an usually forthright opinion, faulted
Congress for outstripping its power under the Commerce Clause and for construing a right
to privacy where none exists.
"The DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in
state motor vehicle records," Judge Karen J. Williams wrote for the majority. "Thus, rather
than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally applies to the States, Congress
passed a law that, for all intents and purposes, applies only to the States."
Speaking to the privacy issue, Judge Williams noted that the assertion that the DPPA
enforced individuals "Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in their names, addresses, and
phone numbers" was out of step with the Supreme Court's established privacy doctrine, not
to mention the purely remedial powers granted Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ridiculing the idea of a right to privacy in one's personal information, Judge Williams
pointed out that a state-issued driver's license already "is often needed to cash a check, use a
credit card, board an airplane, or purchase alcohol." 'We seriously doubt that an individual
has a constitutional right to privacy in information routinely shared with strangers," she
concluded.
In dissent, Judge J. Dickson Phillips Jr. disagreed with the majority's Commerce Clause
analysis. "To assume that Congress could only regulate the states' conduct directly if it also
equally regulated comparable private conduct (even where none in fact exists) seems to me
to bear no relationship to any concept of federalism implicit in the Tenth Amendment as
interpreted by the Supreme Court," he wrote.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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Judge Phillips also pointed out that the only difference between the DPPA and other
legislation approved by the Supreme Court aimed at regulating state conduct was Congress'
decision to eschew its usual means of ensuring state compliance. "Congress could have, had
it desired, made receipt of federal highway funds contingent on accepting DPPA's
provisions," he wrote. "Similarly, Congress could almost assuredly have completely
preempted the field of motor vehicle information disclosure" by enacting its own disclosure
policy, a "drastic move," Judge Phillips noted, which in another context had nonetheless met
with Supreme Court approval.
Crucial to Judge Phillips's reasoning was the way he characterized the DPPA's effect on
the states. "[T]he DPPA does not require that states act at all," he wrote. "Its provisions
only apply once a state makes the voluntary choice to enter the interstate market created by
the release of personal information in its files." Because it regulates state activities only, not
state regulation of private parties, Judge Phillips concluded, the DPPA should be allowed to
stand.
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98-1464 Reno v. Condon
Ruling below (4h Cir., 155 F.3d 453, 67 U.S.L.W. 1139, 26 Media L. Rep. 2185):
1994 Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which bars state motor vehicle departments from
disclosing "personal information" contained in motor vehicle records and bars individuals
from obtaining or disclosing such information for uses not permitted by statute, is not valid
exercise of Congress's powers under commerce clause or Section 5 of 14t Amendment but,
instead, violated 10 Amendment.
Question presented: Does 1994 Driver's Privacy Protection Act contravene constitutional
principles of federalism?
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Charlie CONDON, Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Janet RENO, Attorney General of the United States, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided September 3, 1998
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
The Attorney General of the State of
South Carolina (the State) challenged the
constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA) * * * in the
United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina on the grounds
that it violated the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments to the United States
Constitution. * * * The United States
defended the DPPA, arguing that it was
lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress's
powers under both the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. After reviewing the parties'
arguments, the district court held that the
DPPA violated the Tenth Amendment
and permanently enjoined its enforcement
in the State of South Carolina. * *
On appeal, the United States first
contends that the DPPA was lawfully
enacted pursuant to Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. Although
Congress may regulate entities engaged in
interstate commerce, Congress is
constrained in the exercise of that power
by the Tenth Amendment. As a result,
when exercising its Commerce Clause
power, Congress may only "subject state
governments to generally applicable laws."
* * * The DPPA exclusively regulates the
disclosure of personal information
contained in state motor vehicle records.
Thus, rather than enacting a law of general
applicability that incidentally applies to the
States, Congress passed a law that, for all
intents and purposes, applies only to the
States. Accordingly, the DPPA is simply
not a valid exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power.
In the alternative, the United States
contends that the DPPA was lawfully
enacted pursuant to Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When enacting legislation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, Congress's power
"extends only to enforc[ing] the
provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment." * * * The United States
asserts that individuals possess a
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy
in their names, addresses, and phone
numbers, and that the DPPA enforces
that constitutional right. Neither the
Supreme Court nor this Court, however,
has ever recognized a constitutional right
to privacy with respect to such
information. Congress is granted a
remedial power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not a substantive
power. As a consequence, the DPPA is
not a valid exercise of Congress's
Enforcement Clause power.
Under our system of dual sovereignty,
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
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by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
Const. amend. X. Because Congress
lacked the authority to enact the DPPA
under either the Commerce Clause or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED.
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Adopted in 1994 as part of larger
omnibus crime legislation, the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) *** is a
unique federal enactment designed to
address the privacy and safety concerns
flowing from the unfettered disclosure of
personal information contained in drivers'
license files maintained by state motor
vehicle departments. Pigeonholing the
Act into one of two narrow legal
constructs that it apparently believes
exclusively define the Tenth
Amendment's constraints on federal
power, the majority concludes that the
Act is unconstitutional because it
impermissibly regulates States as States
and because it is not a law of general
applicability to both State and private
actors. I dissent, believing that the unique
structure and internal operation of the
DPPA, considered in light of the harm
generated by the States' own actions at
which it is aimed, distinguish this case
from those upon which the majority relies
and compels the conclusion that the Act is
consistent with both substantive and
structural limitations on the exercise of
federal power. * * *
Because the DPPA regulates the flow
of personal information-information
that is consistently in the stream of
commerce and for which States receive
substantial reimbursement-the only issue
in this case is whether Congress may,
consistent with the Tenth Amendment,
impose its will on States respecting
conduct uniquely engaged in by States and
state actors. * * * It follows that, in
exercise of its Commerce Clause powers,
Congress could have, had it desired, made
receipt of federal highway funds
contingent on accepting DPPA's
provisions. *** Similarly, Congress
could almost assuredly have completely
preempted the field of motor vehicle
information disclosure, a drastic move
that States would undoubtedly resist but
on which, in an analogous setting, the
Court has placed its seal of approval. * * *
Instead, Congress chose to regulate the
States directly, without offering the
"incentive" of public funds or threatening
to preempt the field.
The majority concedes, as it must, that
the end object of the Act is the direct
regulation of state conduct. It is not the
indirect regulation of private conduct-
here information use-by forcing the
states directly to regulate that conduct, in
the way that the states were held
impermissibly compelled to regulate the
waste-handling conduct of private parties
in New York v. United States * * *_ Nor
does the Act make South Carolina an
executive instrument of the federal
government in the way the Brady Act was
held impermissibly to have conscripted
local law enforcement officials to enforce
federal law in Printz v. United States * * *.
It is the direct regulation of the State
activity here which distinguishes the
DPPA, in the most fundamental of ways,
from the federal legislation struck down
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respectively in New York and Printq.
Unlike the New York legislation, the
DPPA does not "commandeer[] the
legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program."
* * * It is true that states that choose to
disclose motor vehicle information must
take steps to administer their programs in
conformity with federal guidelines. But
that administration will be of their own
choosing and will not in any way be a
"federal regulatory program." And it is
settled that not every kind of federally
forced state administration to comply with
federal law violates the Tenth
Amendment. In South Carolina v. Baker,
** * the Court upheld a federally
imposed requirement that public bonds
issue only in registered form. Although
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 required States to abandon
their previous bearer systems and install
completely different administrative
programs, the Baker Court dismissed
South Carolina's argument that this
burden unconstitutionally coerced state
officials. The undoubted burden was,
explained the Court, simply "an inevitable
consequence of regulating a state activity."
* * * The Court went on to say that a
State wishing to engage in certain activity
must take administrative and sometimes
legislative action to comply with federal
standards regulating that activity is a
commonplace that presents no
constitutional defect. ** *
The DPPA does not require that
states prohibit private individuals from
obtaining information in violation of its
provisions. Section 2723(a) prohibits this
directly by making violation of the DPPA
a federal offense. In fact, the DPPA does
not require that states act at all. Its
provisions only apply once a State makes
the voluntary choice to enter the interstate
market created by the release of personal
information in its files. As did the
compelled adoption by the states of a
registered bond system, the DPPA only
"regulates state activities: it does not ...
seek to control or influence the manner in
which States regulate private parties."
* * * For this reason, New York and PrintZ
do not require invalidating this Act.
Nor do I believe that any other
constitutionally-based federalism
principle, perhaps underlying Printy and
New York at a deeper level, requires its
invalidation. This congressional
enactment requires only that states
choosing to regulate the release of
particular information in their possession
into the stream of interstate commerce do
so in a way Congress deems appropriate.
Elected federal officials have made a
considered policy determination that
unfettered release of this information is
not in the public interest because of
privacy concerns and because it would be
injurious to the interstate market in
information. Whether Congress is right
or not in that determination is irrelevant.
It is sufficient for our purposes that
Congress deems injurious a specific state
activity in which by definition private
actors do not engage. To assume that
Congress could only regulate the states'
conduct directly if it also equally regulated
comparable private conduct (even where
none in fact exists) seems to me to bear
no relationship to any concept of
federalism implicit in the Tenth
Amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
I would reverse the judgment holding
the DPPA unconstitutional as a violation
of the Tenth Amendment.
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HIGH COURT TO HEAR DRIVER PRIVACY CASE
The Washington Post
Tuesday, May 18, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
take up a challenge to a federal law that
forbids states from disclosing the personal
information motorists provide to obtain a
driver's license.
The dispute, to be heard next fall, cuts
to the heart of privacy concerns in today's
high-technology age, when data can be
transferred at the touch of a button. More
broadly, the case could become important in
the Rehnquist court's effort to curtail what
it believes are unwarranted federal
intrusions into states' prerogatives. A
narrow but determined majority has struck
down several acts of Congress in recent
terms as encroaching on state authority.
The 1994 Driver's Privacy Protection
Act arose from congressional concern about
stalkers and other criminals who used motor
vehicle records to track down their
victims-particularly the case of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer, who was murdered in
1989 by a man who found her California
address through motor vehicle records. The
law generally forbids personal information
from being disclosed but provides
numerous exceptions for public safety, anti-
fraud and other authorized purposes.
Several states say the act, which began
taking effect in most places in 1997, is an
unconstitutional burden on them. They
object not only to the prohibition on
disclosing data that they routinely sell to
businesses, but also contend that
because the statute is riddled with
exceptions, it is complicated to carry
out.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down the law last year,
ruling that Congress was impermissibly
forcing states to run a federal program.
But appeals courts nationwide have
been divided over the constitutionality
of the act, and in the South Carolina
case taken yesterday, both the Justice
Department and the state said the
Supreme Court should decide the issue
once and for all.
Motorists typically provide an array
of information to obtain a driver's
license, including name, address,
telephone number and, in some cases,
Social Security number, medical
information and photographs. States
often pass along this information to
individuals and businesses, sometimes
making considerable money from it.
The Justice Department said New
York's motor vehicle department earned
$17 million in one year by selling driver
records.
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In its appeal, the Justice Department
asserts that the law was a legitimate use of
Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce after lawmakers found the
"nefarious" use of personal records "posed
a sufficient threat to individuals' personal
safety and autonomy."
But in challenging the law as a burden
on the states, South Carolina officials said in
Reno v. Condon, "The practical reality of
the matter is that [it] commands the
states to maintain a broad and ongoing
administrative effort."
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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PRIVACY ISSUE CASES FLOODING HIGH COURT
The Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle
Sunday, May 30, 1999
JamesJ. Kilpa trick
AT SOME POINT in its next term, the
Supreme Court is likely to be awash in a tide
of privacy issues. A major case will take up
the privacy of motor vehicle records.
Another closely watched appeal will look at
the privacy of police records. There is an
unlikely possibility that the Supremes will
ponder the disclosure of our Social Security
numbers.
This is all to the good. The government
has undoubted power to require a vast deal
of personal information from the people it
governs. Willy-nilly, we disgorge
information about our incomes, our
illnesses, our births and marriages and
deaths. The question is, what records must
the government maintain in confidence?
What information may the government
disclose?
APART FROM the propriety of
disclosing a lady's age, as recorded on her
driver's license, the cases present an
overriding constitutional question. How
viable is the 10th Amendment? To some of
us curbstone constitutionalists, the 10th is
the key that unlocks the house of our
fathers. To others, quoting Justice Harlan
Stone, the 10th states a mere "truism." We'll
see about that.
In Reno v. Condon, the High Court faces
the 10th Amendment squarely. The
amendment says that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people."
Every word of the 10th Amendment
carries a weight of fundamental principle.
Here is the foundation of federalism.
The federal government has only those
powers delegated to it by the Con
stitution. If the Constitution does not
vest a particular power in Congress, the
courts or the executive branch, the
power does not exist-or rather, the
power remains with the states
"respectively."
In 1994, as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act, Congress passed the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act. In
general, the act prohibits the states from
disclosing certain personal information
in their motor vehicle records.
IN ADOPTING the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, Congress acted
on the best of motives. In the wrong
hands, data lifted from motor vehicle
records can lead to serious crime. In
1989, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was
murdered by a man who obtained her
address from her driver's license.
Testimony before congressional
committees in 1993 and 1994 turned up
similar incidents.
There's another side. The states
routinely sell motor vehicle records to
attorneys, automobile dealers and
automobile manufacturers. New York
earned $17 million in one year from
sales of license data.
In 1997, South Carolina took the
lead in challenging the act as a violation
of the 10th Amendment. In the view of
Attorney General Charlie Condon, the
Constitution does not delegate power to
Congress to say what a sovereign state
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may do with its own records. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit agreed.
The act is beyond congressional reach under
the commerce clause, said Judge Karen J.
Williams. The 7th and 10th Circuits have
taken the opposite view.
THE HIGH COURT has agreed to
hear a separate but similar case from
California. The state adopted a law
prohibiting local sheriffs and police
departments from selling information
gleaned from records of arrest. United
Reporting Publishing Corp. buys such
records and resells the data to attorneys,
insurance companies, alcohol counselors
and driving schools. The law is so riddled
with exceptions for journalistic and
investigative purposes that the 9h Circuit
found it violates the corporation's right of
access to public documents.
A third privacy case has been filed by a
Louisiana woman, Mary Vice Evans, whose
son died as a result of an automobile
accident. She sued an insurance
company and other defendants. They
responded by demanding her Social
Security number (and her son's) for
purposes of preparing interrogatories.
She balked, citing a constitutional right
of privacy. The Louisiana Supreme
Court ordered her to provide the
numbers for restricted use.
A CONSTITUTIONAL right of
privacy may exist somewhere out in the
penumbra of the law, but I doubt that
Mrs. Evans will win a full-dress review
in the High Court. Come October, the
Supremes will have about all the privacy
issues they can handle.
Copyright C 1999 Southeastern
Newspapers Corporation
158
FOURTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT DRIVER'S PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT VIOLATES TENTH AMENDMENT
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3D 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
Harvard Law Review
March, 1999
Recent Case
Recent Supreme Court decisions have
suggested that the Tenth Amendment limits
Commerce Clause power to a greater extent
than previously predicted. Last September,
in Condon v. Reno, the Fourth Circuit
followed this trend, finding the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA)
unconstitutional. Because the Fourth
Circuit failed to consider states' ability to
avoid the DPPA's mandates, its analysis
diverged from the Court's focus on state
choice' as a way to ensure political
accountability and protect federalism.2 In
so doing, the decision further split Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence under the
Commerce Clause from related Tenth
'"State choice" indicates a state's ability to
opt out of a statute by not legislating in a
given field, by leaving that field, or by never
entering the field in the first place.
2 Although only one means of protecting
federalism, political accountability concerns
have been of primary importance in recent
decisions, see, e.g., Printz, 117 S. Ct. at
2377, and at least one commentator views
political accountability as fundamental to
federalism, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political
Process--The Alternative to Judicial Review
of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev.
577, 582-83 (1985). The question of
accountability is one not only of the locus
of decisionmaking, but also of state and
national perception of that locus.
Amendment decisions dealing with field
preemption and the Spending Clause.
Congress enacted the DPPA to
discourage the "active commerce" in
and "easy availability" of personal
information obtained via motor vehicle
records. The DPPA prohibits state
departments of motor vehicles (DMVs)
and their employees from "knowingly
disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing]
available" such information. The Act
contains a number of exceptions and
allows individuals to waive its
protection. In addition, the Act
imposes criminal fines and civil penalties
for noncompliance.
In September 1997, South Carolina
challenged the DPPA as a violation of
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.
The United States moved to dismiss,
claiming that the Act was lawfully
enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment to South Carolina
and enjoined enforcement of the DPPA.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Writing for the majority, Judge Williams
divided the Supreme Court's Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence into two
distinct lines of cases. The first,
following Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,
"concerns the authority of Congress to
regulate the States as States" and
permits Congress to "enact laws of
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general applicability that incidentally apply
to state governments." The second,
following New York v. United States and
Printz v. United States, "concerns the
authority of Congress to direct the States to
implement or administer ... federal
regulat[ions]" and prohibits Congress from
either "commandeer[ing] the legislative
processes of the States" or "conscripting the
State's officers directly" to effect such
regulations.
Judge Williams distinguished the DPPA,
which regulates only state agencies, from the
statutes upheld in the first line of cases by
holding that, in the context of laws
regulating states as states, only "generally
applicable" regulations are constitutional.
Judge Williams therefore placed the DPPA
within the second line of cases. Although
the DPPA neither commandeers state
legislatures nor conscripts state officers, the
court found that "state officials must ...
administer [the Act]."
Judge Phillips, in dissent, criticized the
majority for "[p]igeonholing the Act into
one of two narrow legal constructs." Judge
Phillips emphasized that the DPPA did not
"commandeer" the South Carolina
legislature because the state could have
stopped selling information compiled using
motor vehicle records. Furthermore, Judge
Phillips contended, because the DPPA
directly regulates a state agency, it differs
fundamentally from statutes that indirectly
regulate private conduct, such as the ones
invalidated in New York and Printz. Citing
South Carolina v. Baker4 as precedent for a
Id. The majority opinion also analyzed the
DPPA under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Condon, 155 F.3d at 463,
but found "no constitutional right to
privacy in the information contained in
motor vehicle records," id. at 465.
4 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Judge Phillips noted
that South Carolina v. Baker demonstrated
broader reading of Garcia, Judge
Phillips considered the DPPA a similarly
permissible federal regulation of state
governments.
Although invoking the "anti-
commandeering" principle as a bright-
line response to Tenth Amendment
concerns, the Fourth Circuit failed to
recognize that the anti-commandeering
standard is inextricably linked to a
state's ability to decline the imposed
regulation. By reading Garcia to
indicate that only "generally applicable"
statutes can be constitutional exercises
of Commerce Clause power over states,
the majority opinion neglected broad
swaths of contrary precedent affirming
the role of state choice in the
constitutional inquiry: the jurisprudence
of "general applicability," field
preemption, and Spending Clause
"encouragement." The majority ignored
states' ability to stop selling motor
vehicle information. Unlike the DPPA,
the challenged statutes in New York and
Printz prevented states from declining
regulatory mandates; thus, their coercive
nature accordingly piqued the Court's
accountability concerns. A more
searching analysis of the Supreme
Court's approach to Tenth Amendment
challenges would uphold the DPPA as a
constitutional regulation of states as
voluntary market participants able to
stop disseminating motor vehicle
information. Such an analysis best
incorporates the Court's accountability
concerns while harmonizing its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence across
doctrinal lines.
"that not every kind of federally forced
state administration to comply with
federal law violates the Tenth
Amendment." Condon, 155 F.3d at 467
(Phillips, J., dissenting).
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At least one Supreme Court decision
demonstrates that a limited "general
applicability" inquiry can be both overly
restrictive and overly manipulable, whereas
a broader determination of the existence of
state choice proves more sustainable. In
South Carolina v. Baker, South Carolina
challenged an amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code that denied federal tax
exemption for interest on unregistered state
and local bonds. Although the statute in
Baker, taken as a whole, could be read as
"generally applicable" in its across-the-
board discouragement of bearer bonds, the
challenged subsection could apply only to a
state.' Nonetheless, the Baker Court
characterized the statute as generally
applicable and upheld it. The similarities
between the Baker statute and the DPPA
are readily apparent: only states (and
municipalities) can issue tax-exempt bonds;
likewise, only states can market DMV
information. Furthermore, under the
statutes at issue in Condon, Garcia, and
Baker, states retained the option, however
impractical, to avoid implementing the
required regulation-all of these situations
demonstrate states' active choices to
participate in economic markets. Because
states have a theoretical right to revoke such
a choice, they cannot raise Tenth
Amendment challenges to the federal
regulation of that market. Finally,
accountability concerns are not at stake
because state political actors have made the
decision to enter a market-Congress has
merely chosen to regulate that entry.
' See id. The challenged statute aimed "to
address the tax evasion concerns posed
generally by unregistered bonds." Id. The
challenged subsection, however, applied
only to tax-exempt bonds issued by states
and municipalities. See id. The Condon
majority refused to read South Carolina v.
Baker as an assessment of the entire statute.
See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
Two legislative techniques that have
withstood Tenth Amendment
scrutiny-field preemption and
Spending Clause encouragement-
suggest that laws of "general
applicability" are but one subset of
statutes that constitutionally restrict, but
do not entirely remove, state choice.
Congress routinely allows state
legislatures to choose between following
congressional guidelines in a given field
and leaving that field altogether. Such
preemption is constitutional, in part
because "the residents of the State retain
the ultimate decision as to whether or
not the State will comply.... [S]tate
governments remain responsive to the
local electorate's preferences; state
officials remain accountable to the
people." Legislation passed pursuant to
the Spending Clause presents state
decision makers with a similar "choice."
Furthermore, the Court has suggested
that neither the existence of an
alternative federal preemptive regime
nor the practicality of a state's decision
to decline federal grants is relevant.
Thus, "encouragement," however
difficult to ignore, has a different
constitutional status from
commandeering or conscription because
states can choose to decline the federal
invitation to regulate. Similarly, because
states can decline to follow the DPPA
by no longer selling driver information,
the practicality of such a course is
irrelevant to the constitutionality of the
Act.
Furthermore, the court should have
found the DPPA constitutional because
the availability of state choice limits
accountability concerns by requiring
affirmative decisions by state
legislatures. In contrast, the statutes
challenged in New York and Printz
raised serious accountability concerns
because state legislatures lacked the
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ability to decline any responsibility for the
regulation-the state could not leave a field,
decline a grant, or exit a market. For
example, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act at issue in New
York presented the state with a "choice"
between unconstitutional alternatives.
Neither choice allowed New York to avoid
enacting unwanted legislation entirely; the
Act "commandeered" the state legislature in
order to implement congressional will.
Similarly, the Brady Act, which was
invalidated in Printz, did not even offer
states a non-regulatory alternative, but
simply "compel[1ed] the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."
Because states could not refuse enactment
or administration, this coercion was
unconstitutional. Unlike the statutes at
issue in New York and Printz, however, the
DPPA does not raise similar accountability
concerns because it leaves states the option
not to disseminate or sell motor vehicle
information, even if many state
governments would be unwilling to make
that difficult choice.
The Supreme Court has slowly
receded from the process-oriented
federalism hinted at in Garcia; the
Court's emphasis on substantive
accountability concerns ultimately
proved fatal to the statutes challenged in
New York and Printz. These cases,
when viewed in conjunction with the
Court's federal preemption and
Spending Clause jurisprudence,
demonstrate the centrality of state
choice to the constitutional inquiry.
The DPPA should have been found
constitutional because it presented a
complicated regulatory scheme with
which states must comply-but only
after states choose to disseminate driver
information. Had the Fourth Circuit
focused on the constant role of state
choice in Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, it could have helped unify
several doctrinal strands without
needlessly narrowing congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.
Copyright C 1999 Harvard Law Review
Association
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VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES
v. UNITED STATES
Blowing the Whistle on State Immunity
Matthew Frey *
A case before the Supreme Court this term will address whether individuals may sue
States on behalf of the federal government under the False Claims Act (FCA), a measure
designed to encourage workers to report mismanagement of federal funds on the job.
Joining a long line of opinions issued this decade concerning the proper balance of state and
federal power, the Court's decision in this case will settle whether state workers may sue
federally funded state agencies under the FCA's so-called "whistle-blower" provision.
Conflicting results in two cases decided recently at the federal level suggest that this issue
is ripe for Supreme Court review. In one involving the University of Minnesota, the Eighth
Circuit in September 1998 held that States were "persons" and therefore liable to suit under
the FCA's provisions. Following that ruling, the University agreed to settle charges it had
failed to report income from an experimental drug to the federal institute that had funded
the drug's development. Later that year, on the other hand, a district court judge in a New
York case found that States were immune from suits under the FCA, a ruling which
nonetheless prompted the defendants in that lawsuit, both the City and the State of New
York, to pay $49 million to settle allegations they had collected federal funds to support
foster programs that neither in fact provided.
The present case arises from a qui tam, or whistle-blower, suit brought by an employee
of the Vermont Agency for Natural Resources. The employee alleges that the agency
overstated the number of hours agency employees spent working on federally funded
projects in an attempt to mislead federal officials.
Writing for the 2-1 majority that ruled that the employee's lawsuit may go forward,
Second Circuit Judge Amalya L. Kearse probed both the language and the legislative history
of the FCA, a measure that dates to an 1863 law that was meant to combat widespread
profiteering among suppliers of the Union army.
Judge Kearse wrote that the FCA's mention of "the term 'any person' . . . is sufficiently
broad to encompass the States; [and] that Congress meant to include the States within the
term 'person."' In addition, she rejected Vermont's claim that it was immune to qui tam suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. "The real party in interest in a qui tam suit is the United
States," she concluded, likening the individual who commences the suit to "an attorney
working for a contingent fee." (Qui tam plaintiffs stand to receive up to 30% of any
damages award.)
In a detailed dissent, Judge Jack B. Weinstein disagreed with the court's finding that
individuals were permitted to pursue claims on the federal government's behalf. "The
federal government's power to sue a state is a narrow and nontransferable exception to the
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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broad and fundamental constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment," he wrote.
Even if that were not true, Judge Weinstein continued, echoing the reasoning contained
in most recent pro-states' rights opinions (see Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents on page 138), a
private party suing a state for money damages "can only be permitted to press his suit if he
can establish Congress' intent under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity." "This a qui tam plaintiff cannot do," Judge Weinstein
concluded.
If Judge Weinstein's views find company among a majority of the Supreme Court, the
federal government will no longer be able to entice would-be whistle-blowers working for
state governments with visions of the nearly $250 million in damages that qui tam plaintiffs
have won for themselves since 1966.
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98-1828 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
Ruling below (2d Cir., 162 F.3d 195, 67 U.S.L.W. 1381):
States are "persons" that can be sued under qui tam provisions of False Claims Act and,
because United States is real party in interest in qui tam litigation, do not enjoy 1 1h
Amendment immunity from qui tam suits brought by individuals.
Questions presented: (1) Is state "person" subject to liability under FCA? (2) Does 11 th
Amendment preclude private relator from commencing and prosecuting FCA suit against
unconsenting state?
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UNITED STATES of America, ex rel. Jonathan STEVENS, qui tam and as relator,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
United States of America, Intervenor,
V.
The STATE OF VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided December 7, 1998
KEARSE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant State of Vermont Agency
of Natural Resources (the "Agency" or
the "State") appeals from an order of the
United States District Court for the
District of Vermont, J. Garvan Murtha,
Chief Judge, denying the State's motion to
dismiss the present qui tam suit brought
by Jonathan Stevens on behalf of the
United States under the False Claims Act
* * * ("FCA" or the "Act"), for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The district
court ruled that the State is a "person"
within the meaning of § 3729(a) and is
thus subject to suit under the Act, and
that such suits are not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The State
challenges these rulings on appeal. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At all relevant times, the Agency was a
recipient of federal funds, and Stevens
was an employee of the Agency. Stevens
commenced this action as a qui tam suit
under the FCA for himself and the United
States, alleging that the Agency had made
fraudulent claims against the United
States. The allegations of the complaint,
taken as true for purposes of the State's
motion to dismiss, include the following.
A. The Complaint
The Agency, through its Department
of Environmental Conservation ("DEC")
and a DEC subdivision called the Water
Supply Division ("WSD"), was the
recipient of a series of federal grants
administered by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") * * *. These grants, which
substantially funded WSD's budget,
provided federal funds to pay for, inter
alia, salary expenses for work performed
by WSD employees in connection with
the grants.
As a recipient of these funds, the
Agency was subject to certain reporting
requirements, including the requirement
that it submit time and attendance records
reflecting the hours actually worked and
the work actually performed by the
pertinent individual employees. The
complaint alleges that DEC instead made
advance estimates of the
federal-grant-attributable time to be
worked by individual WSD employees in a
given federal fiscal year and instructed
those employees to fill out their biweekly
reports, purporting to show actual work
done, to match DEC's estimates,
regardless of the time actually worked
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The complaint alleges that the Agency
thus "knowingly and continuously
submitted false claims to EPA for salary
and wage expenses of its employees
purporting to show that employees were
working on federally-funded projects
when, in fact, they were not working the
hours as reported." * * * This allowed the
Agency to retain funds to which it was not
entitled for a given year. In addition,
because DEC reported each year that all
of the federal grant moneys received had
been properly used, and proceeded to
submit new grant requests using estimates
based on the previous year's reported
spending level, the false reports for a
given year enabled the Agency to maintain
or increase its funding in each succeeding
fiscal year.
Stevens and other DEC employees
complained to their supervisors that the
biweekly reports that DEC instructed the
employees to fill out were not accurate
and that the reported hours were not
being worked. Management instructed
them to continue in accordance with
DEC's prior instructions. The complaint
also alleges, on information and belief,
that a similar course of action was
followed in several DEC subdivisions
other than WSD.
B. The Denial of the State's Motion To
Disn2iss
In March 1997, the State moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, contending (1) that states and
their instrumentalities (collectively
"States") are not "person[s]" under §
3729(a) who are subjected to suit or
liability by the terms of the Act, and (2)
that, in any event, the imposition of such
liability on the States would violate the
Eleventh Amendment. Stevens opposed
the motion and was supported by the
United States as amicus curiae.
In an Order dated May 9, 1997
("Order"), the district court denied the
motion to dismiss. The court rejected the
State's contention that the Act does not
make States "person[s]" who are subject
to liability under the Act, noting that
States have considered themselves
"persons" within the meaning of the Act
in order to bring suits as qui tam plaintiffs,
and pointing out that, as a matter of
statutory construction, identical words
used in different parts of the same statute
should normally be accorded the same
meaning. The court stated that
it would be anomalous to
acknowledge that a state is a
"person" within the meaning of the
statute if it chooses to bring a False
Claims Act suit, but that the same
state is not a "person" if named as a
defendant.
* ** The court rejected the State's claim
of Eleventh Amendment immunity on the
ground that that Amendment does not
bar suits against the States by the United
States itself, and that the United States "is
the real party in interest and ultimately the
primary beneficiary of a successful qui tam
action." * * *
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State contends (1) that
Congress did not intend to subject States
to suit or liability under the FCA, and (2)
that to the extent that the Act is construed
to permit qui tam suits against the States,
the Act violates the immunity conferred
on the States by the Eleventh
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Amendment. The United States, which
declined to intervene in the suit in the
district court, has intervened in this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 517 and 2403(a)
(1994) to support the decision of the
district court.
A. The Scope and Qui Tam
Provisions of the Act
The FCA imposes civil liability on
"[a]ny person" who makes a false
monetary claim to the United States
government. * * * Such a person is liable
to the government for treble damages plus
a $5,000-$10,000 civil penalty:
If a qui tam action has been brought,
the United States must be given an
opportunity to intervene and take control
of the action. * * * Failure to comply with
[certain] mandatory threshold
requirements warrants dismissal of the qui
tam complaint with prejudice, which bars
the qui tam plaintiff from refiling such a
suit, but leaves the government free to
bring suit on its own. **
B. The Eleventh Amendment Defense
The Eleventh Amendment provides
that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Although the terms of the Amendment,
which embody the principle of sovereign
immunity, refer only to suits against a
state by persons who are not citizens of
that state, it is clear that, unless the state
has given its consent, the Amendment
also bars a suit against the state by its own
citizens, *** as well as suits by a foreign
nation, *** or by an Indian tribe * * *.
As against the United States, however,
States have no sovereign immunity. ** *
When the States, in framing and adopting
the Constitution, agreed to create a federal
government "established for the common
and equal benefit of the people of all the
States," * * *, they necessarily recognized
that the privilege of immunity would be
inconsistent with that government's
paramount sovereignty. A permanent
waiver of the States' immunity from suit
by the United States is "inherent in the
constitutional plan." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. at 329; see
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. at 781-82; United States v.
Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) ("[o]f
course the immunity of the State is subject
to the constitutional qualification that she
may be sued .. . by the United States");
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 64. In
sum, "nothing in [the Eleventh
Amendment] or in any other provision of
the Constitution prevents or has ever
been seriously supposed to prevent a
State's being sued by the United States."
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,
140 (1965); see also Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n. 14 (1996) ("the
Federal Government can bring suit in
federal court against a State").
The question for the present case is
whether a qui tam suit under the FCA
should be viewed as a private action by an
individual, and hence barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, or one brought by
the United States, and hence not barred.
The interests to be vindicated, in
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combination with the government's ability
to control the conduct and duration of the
qui tam suit, persuade us that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar such a
suit.
The real party in interest in a qui tam
suit is the United States. All of the acts
that make a person liable under § 3729(a)
focus on the use of fraud to secure
payment from the government. It is the
government that has been injured by the
presentation of such claims; it is in the
government's name that the action must
be brought; it is the government's injury
that provides the measure for the damages
that are to be trebled; and it is the
government that must receive the lion's
share-at least 70%--of any recovery. To
be sure, the qui tam plaintiff has an
interest in the action's outcome, but his
interest is less like that of a party than that
of an attorney working for a contingent
fee. * * * Qui tam claims simply do not
seek the vindication of a right belonging
to the private plaintiff, and if there has
been no injury to the United States, the
qui tam plaintiff cannot recover.
In sum, "although qui tam actions
allow individual citizens to initiate
enforcement against wrongdoers who
cause injury to the public at large, the
Government remains the real party in
interest in any such action." ***
Further, as described in Part II.A., the
government has the right to control the
action. If it wishes to intervene in the
action at the outset, the qui tam plaintiff
cannot prevent it from doing so. Whether
or not the government intervenes, it has
the right to be kept abreast of discovery in
the qui tam suit and the right to prevent
that discovery from interfering with its
investigation or pursuit of a criminal or
civil suit arising out of the same facts. If
the government intervenes, it takes
control of the lawsuit; it may have the
participation of the qui tam plaintiff
limited; and it is not bound by any act of
the qui tam plaintiff. The government has
both the right to prevent a dismissal
sought by the qui tam plaintiff and the
right to cause the action to be dismissed
for any rational governmental reason,
notwithstanding the qui tam plaintiffs
desire that it continue.
In light of the fact that qui tam claims
are designed to remedy only wrongs done
to the United States, and in light of the
substantial control that the government is
entitled to exercise over such suits, we
conclude that such a suit is in essence a
suit by the United States and hence is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ***
We thus turn to the remaining
question, over which we exercise pendent
appellate jurisdiction, of whether qui tam
suits against the States are authorized by
the Act.
C. Applicability of the False Claims
Act to the States
The question is whether "person" in
3729(a), the section imposing liability,
includes States. At the outset, we note the
State's contention that we should apply
the "plain statement" rule and decline to
construe § 3729(a) as exposing the States
to liability absent the clearest of legislative
statements that that was Congress's intent.
We reject this contention.
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In the FCA, we see no alteration of
"the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers" such as to
require application of the plain statement
rule. The Act does not intrude into any
area of traditional state power. The goal
of the statute is simply to remedy and
deter procurement of federal funds by
means of fraud. The States have no right
or authority, traditional or otherwise, to
engage in such conduct. Accordingly, we
reject the State's contention that the plain
statement rule applies, and we turn to the
question of the proper interpretation of
the FCA using the usual standards of
statutory construction.
Under the usual standards, although
"in common usage[] the term 'person'
does not include the sovereign, . . . there is
no hard and fast rule of exclusion." * * *
"Whether the term 'person' when used in
a federal statute includes a State cannot be
abstractly declared, but depends upon its
legislative environment." *** "The
purpose, the subject matter, the context,
the legislative history, and the executive
interpretation of the statute are aids to
construction which may indicate an intent,
by the use of the term, to bring [a] state . .
within the scope of the law." * * *
In the FCA, the principal uses of the
term "person" are found in 31 U.S.C. §§
3729 and 3730, which provide that "[a]ny
person" is liable for making false claim, id.
( 3729(a); that the Attorney General may
bring a civil action "against the person,"
id. 3730(a); and that "[a] person" may
bring a qui tam action, id. § 3730(b)(1).
Thus, the same term is used to categorize
both those who may sue and those who
may be sued, whether by the government
itself or by a qui tam plaintiff.
In a number of instances, States have
brought suits under the FCA as qui tam
plaintiffs, clearly indicating that they
viewed themselves as "person[s]" within
the meaning of § 3730(b)(1). * * * That
view clearly was also shared by Congress.
We thus think it plain that the States
are "persons" within the meaning of §
3730(b)(1). Absent some indication to the
contrary, we normally infer that in using
the same word in more than one section
of a statute-or indeed twice within the
same section, as in subsections (a) and (b)
of 5 3730-Congress meant the word to
have the same meaning. * * * We see
nothing in the language of the FCA to
indicate that Congress intended that States
would be "person[s]" within the meaning
of § 3730(b)(1) but not "person[s]" within
the meaning of § 3729(a) or § 3730(a).
Nor do we see any such indication in
the legislative history. The FCA has its
origin in a 1863 statute entitled "An Act
to prevent and punish Frauds upon the
Government of the United States" * * *.
The 1863 Act similarly used the term
"person" to designate both those who
could be found liable under the law and
those who could bring suit on behalf of
the government. * * * With respect to
false monetary claims made to the United
States, the 1863 Act imposed both
criminal and civil liability on "any person
in the land or naval forces of the United
States," * * * and on "any person not in
the military or naval forces," * * *. The
1863 Act provided that a qui tam suit
could be brought "by any person," against
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"the person doing or committing" the
forbidden fraudulent act. ***
In sum, we conclude that the term
"[a]ny person" in § 3729(a) is sufficiently
broad to encompass the States; that
Congress meant to include the States
within the term "person" in § 3730(b)(1),
allowing them to bring suits under that
section as qui tam plaintiffs; that there is
no indication in the language or in the
legislative history that Congress ascribed
different meanings to the term "person"
as used in §§ 3729(a), 37 30(a), and
3730(b)(1); and that Congress intended
the false-claims statutes to permit suits
under §§ 3730(a) and 3730(b)(1) against
any entity that presented false monetary
claims to the government. We thus
conclude that the present suit is
authorized by the FCA.
executive branch, and undermines
cooperative relationships between federal
and state agencies.
III. LAW
A. Eleventh Amendment
1. Suits by Individuals
Although the [Eleventh] Amendment
makes no explicit reference to sovereign
immunity, it has consistently been
interpreted to mean that a state, as a
sovereign entity within our constitutional
system, may not be sued by an individual-
whether a citizen of that state, another
state or a foreign country-in federal court
without its consent. * * *
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of the State's
arguments on this appeal and have found
them to be without merit. The district
court's order denying the State's motion
to dismiss is affirmed.
WEINSTEIN, District Judge, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
I respectfully dissent from this
decision approving a private qui tam
federal court lawsuit against a state. In
violation of the Eleventh Amendment, the
result distorts the dynamics of our federal
system, denigrates the traditional role of
congresspersons as bridges between their
state communities and the national
a. Onginal Understanding
There is no record of any discussion
of state immunity at the Constitutional
Convention. Nevertheless, federal courts'
jurisdiction over suits by private citizens
against states which had not consented to
such litigation was disavowed by the
framers of the Constitution during the
pre-ratification debate over the meaning
and scope of Article III.
b. Broad Conception
The current broad conception of the
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Eleventh Amendment as the
constitutional guarantor of state sovereign
immunity is usually traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 ***.
Any attempted abrogation by
Congress of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity is subject to two
strict requirements. *** First, Congress
must unequivocally express its intent to
abrogate the immunity, a requirement
which arises from "the Eleventh
Amendment's role as an essential
component of our constitutional
structure." * * * Second, Congress'
abrogation of sovereign immunity must be
"pursuant to a valid exercise of power"
under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. * * * The Fourteenth
Amendment warrants this distinction, the
Seminole Tribe Court explained, because it
was adopted "well after the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment and the
ratification of the Constitution [and it]
operated to alter the pre-existing balance
between the state and federal power
achieved by Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment." * * *
2. Suits by the United States
a. Original Understanding
It is well settled that the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
extend to suits brought against them by
the federal government. * * *
Suits by the United States against a
state do not denigrate the dignity and
respect owed the states in the way that
suits by individuals do. "The submission
to judicial solution of controversies arising
between [the United States and a state],
'each sovereign, with respect to the
objects committed to it, and neither
sovereign with respect to the objects
committed to the other,'. . . but both
subject to the supreme law of the land,
does no violence to the inherent nature of
sovereignty." ***
The possibility of suits by the United
States against the states is essential to our
federal system. Early on, the framers
recognized that the power to enforce
federal law against the states would be
vital to the Union's stability. * ** Justice
Story regarded federal jurisdiction over
suits to which the United States is a party
as an absolute necessity: "Unless this
power were given to the United States, the
enforcement of all their rights, powers,
contracts and privileges in their sovereign
capacity would be at the mercy of the
states."
b. No Delegation
The federal government's power to sue a
state is a narrow and nontransferable
exception to the broad and fundamental
constitutional principle of state sovereign
immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment. The Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that the federal
government may delegate its authority to
sue the states in federal court. * * *
B. Fundamental to Federalism
The Supreme Court's generous,
protective interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment reflects its recognition that
the Amendment, as the constitutional
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repository of state sovereign immunity, is
essential to the preservation of our federal
system. *** Accordingly, any discussion
of the Eleventh Amendment must take
place within the larger context of our
federalism and the constitutional balance
it was designed to maintain.
1. Original Understanding
Our federalism is dynamic, ensuring
decentralization of power by maintaining
an appropriate balance between the
federal and state governments even as
demands on these sovereignties change.
* * * The founders were well aware that
the creation of a system of government
capable of fostering and safeguarding a
process which would continuously
balance centrifugal and centripetal forces
was a necessary precondition of the
Constitution's ratification and of its
successful operation.
The subsequent expansion of central
power resulted in part from ratification of
the post-Civil War Amendments and the
increasingly broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and spending power in
response to the growth of our national
technological, economic and social
systems. Nevertheless, even the Civil
War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and enormous
recent changes in our culture, did not alter
our essential federal constitutional
structure. * * *
2. Current Views
The continuing potency of the states
has recently been emphasized by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases
demonstrating an increased sensitivity to
state independence. * * *
These decisions iterate with renewed
vigor the system of "dual sovereignty"
envisioned by the framers and established
by the Constitution with the fundamental
goal of preventing the expansion of state
or federal governmental power at the
expense of the liberty of individuals. ***
b. Qut Tam Suits Measured Against
Eleventh Amendment
As a private party in interest suing a
state for money damages, the relator can
only be permitted to press his suit if he
can establish Congress' clear intent under
the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. *** This a qui tam plaintiff
cannot do.
First, the language of the False Claims
Act mentions neither the states' sovereign
immunity nor the Eleventh or Fourteenth
Amendments. The Act provides only that
"[a]ny person" is subject to liability. ***
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that such general authorizations for suit in
federal court are insufficient to abrogate
the protections of the Eleventh
Amendment. * * *
Even if Congress had made its intent
to abrogate the states' immunity from
private suit unmistakable in the language
of the Act, this clear expression would fall
short of overriding the Eleventh
Amendment. The only authority
recognized by the Supreme Court as a
basis for abrogating state sovereign
immunity is Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. * * * The Fourteenth
Amendment deals with such matters as
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civil rights and equal protection. It has
never been put forward as support for the
kind of qui tam action authorized by the
FCA. Rather, the FCA was enacted under
Article I of the Constitution. As the
Court made clear in Seminole Tribe, "Article
I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limits placed on federal
jurisdiction." ***
Nor may the relator seek to bypass the
requirements of the Eleventh Amendment
by cloaking himself in the federal
government's power to sue a state. * *
[This exception] does not carry over to
the relator's suit simply by virtue of the
fact that he is deemed a substitute for the
United States for standing purposes. The
theory that the qui tam relator has
somehow been "deputized" as an agent of
the United States through the language of
the FCA ignores the fact that the relator
does not sue under the auspices and
control of the United States, but exercises
his own statutory right to bring suit * * *,
a right which is afforded procedural
protections by specific provisions of the
FCA.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the False Claims Act fails
plainly to state Congress' design under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity, because
destruction of the states' sovereign
immunity by the qui tam provisions of the
False Claims Act unnecessarily upsets a
cooperative process essential to American
federalism, and because Appellee's suit
against the State of Vermont is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, this qui tam
action against the State of Vermont
should be dismissed. However rational
and desirable this form of qui tam action
may be to protect the federal fisc, it is
barred by the Constitution.
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ANOTHER APPEALS CT UPHOLDS FALSE CLAIMS ACT SUITS
VS STATES
DowJones News Service
Tuesday, December 8, 1998
Michael Rapoport
NEW YORK (Dow Jones) - State
agencies can be held liable for misusing fe
deral funds under a key law employed by
whistle-blowers, another federal appeals
court ruled Tuesday.
The 2-1 ruling by a three-judge panel
of the Second U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in New York said an employee
of the Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources can proceed with a lawsuit
against the agency under the federal False
Claims Act.
The ruling is the second major victory
in three months for whistle-blowers as
they attempt to fend off states' attempts
to carve out exemptions from the law,
which is used to fight alleged fraud by
government contractors as well as states
and cities. In September, the Eighth U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar
ruling that allowed a whistle-blower to sue
the University of Minnesota.
"We're ecstatic," said Mark G. Hall,
an attorney for Jonathan Stevens, the
employee who originally filed the
Vermont suit. "We think it's the right
decision."
Vermont Assistant Attorney General
Ronald Shems had no immediate on
the ruling. Representatives of the U.S.
Attorney's office in Vermont couldn't
immediately be reached.
The False Claims Act is a Civil War-
era law that allows individuals to file
lawsuits on the federal government's
behalf accusing government contractors
or others of fraud in obtaining or using
federal funds. If the suit is successful, the
individual gets part of any verdict or
settlement.
The Vermont case concerns
Environmental Protection Agency grants
for employee salaries in the Vermont
agency's Water Supply Division. The suit
alleges that the Vermont agency filed
misleading reports with the federal
government about the time those
employees were spending on federally
funded projects, allowing the agency to
retain funds it wasn't entitled to.
The Vermont agency has tried to get
the suit dismissed, claiming the agency
isn't a "person" subject to False Claims
Act suits under the terms of the law.
Twenty-six other states sided with
Vermont, filing a friend-of-the-court brief
on its behalf
But a lower court ruled, and the
appeals court agreed, that states are
considered "persons" who Congress
intended to hold liable for damages. The
appeals court noted that states themselves
have brought False Claims Act lawsuits as
plaintiffs in a number of cases, and so it is
"plain" they can also be sued as
defendants.
"It's absolutely the correct decision,"
said John Phillips of Phillips & Cohen in
Washington, a prominent whistle-blowers'
attorney. Now, he said, the chances are
"much greater that kind of fraud (by
states) is going to be exposed and
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pursued."
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jack B.
Weinstein said allowing False Claims Act
suits against states would violate the 1 1'
Amendment, which exempts states from
federal lawsuits brought by individuals.
Allowing such suits would "distort the
dynamics of the federal system" by
driving a wedge between state agencies
and their federal counterparts, he said.
The Eighth Circuit's September ruling
concerned a suit in which the University
of Minnesota was charged with reaping
profits from illegal sales of an
experimental drug for which the federal
government had funded the research.
The appeals court's ruling allowed the
suit to proceed, and the university later
settled the lawsuit for $32 million.
Copyright C) 1998, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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WHISTLEBLOWER SUITS MAY TARGET STATES
Question Seen Headed for Supreme Court
New York LawJournal
Wednesday, December 9, 1998
Deborah Pines
RULING ON an issue likely to be
resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, a
sharply divided Manhattan federal appeals
panel on Monday declared that states can
be targets of the big-damages federal
whistleblower suits typically brought
against contractors to recover fraudulently
obtained federal funds.
The 2-1 decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit panel,
which gave the go-ahead to a lawyer's suit
against a Vermont State environmental
agency, found no constitutional or
statutory reason why states cannot be
"persons" subject to qui tam suits under
the False Claims Act (FCA), which
permits treble damages and penalties of as
much as $10,000 per false claim.
The Eleventh Amendment, which
precludes citizen suits against states, does
not preclude these whistleblower actions
because the federal government "remains
the real party of interest," Second Circuit
Judge Amalya L. Kearse wrote for the
majority in United States of America, ex
rel. Jonathan Stevens, qw tam and as
relator v. The State of Vermont, 97-6141.
Judge Kearse also found the act's
language and Civil War roots indicate
Congress intended states to be among the
many "persons" that can be sued in qui
tam lawsuits. Whistleblowers who file
such suits can recover bounties of as
much as 30 percent of the often
multi-million dollar claims.
Judge Kearse's ruling, joined in by
Second Circuit Judge John M. Walker,
followed an Eighth Circuit ruling in
September reaching the same result on the
issue that has split several district courts
and is pending before appellate panels in
the Fifth and D.C. Circuits.
Dissenting, in a strongly worded
46-page opinion, was a visiting judge,
Eastern District Judge Jack B. Weinstein
who claimed that permitting qui tam suits
against states "distorts the dynamic of our
federal system."
Treble Damages
Ronald A. Shems, a Vermont
Assistant Attorney General who had
pressed the Second Circuit to reverse a
lower court and find Vermont unmune
from suit, said no decision has been made
about an appeal.
Frederick Robinson of Fulbright &
Jaworski, Washington, D.C., who had
filed an amicus brief on behalf of state
medical colleges, one of many groups that
supported Vermont's position, said the
ruling leads to a result Congress never
intended. "A citizen should not be able to
sue a state and get punitive damages
which only punishes the citizens of the
state by opening up the treasury and
taking money that should be spent on
education, fire, police, roads, all the public
services you need," Mr. Robinson said.
Sonya Sanchez, a spokeswoman for
State Attorney General Dennis Vacco,
who joined other attorneys general in
supporting Vermont, said "the court's
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decision exposes states and taxpayers to
treble damages liability and raises
significant issues concerning the
relationship between the federal
government and the states."
The winning lawyer, Mark G. Hall, of
Paul, Frank & Collins, in Burlington, Vt.,
who represented whistleblower Jonathan
Stevens, said the Second Circuit ruling is
significant because it represents an
influential court endorsing an expansive
interpretation of this anti-fraud statute.
"To shield states, state universities and
medical colleges would let a lot of people
off the hook for fraud," Mr. Hall said.
Time Allocation Issue
The Second Circuit ruling affirmed a
1997 decision from Vermont Chief
District Court Judge J. Garvan Murtha
permitting the False Claims Act suit by
Mr. Stevens, of Burlington, Vt., a former
lawyer with the Water Supply Division of
the State of Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources. Mr. Stevens's suit claimed that
division's method of reporting the time
employees spent in 1993 and 1994 on
federally funded projects amounted to
fraud on the federal government.
His division, he claimed, routinely
submitted time sheets indicating
employees worked pre-approved hours,
rather than actual hours. His suit, seeking
the return of millions of dollars in funding
to the federal government, seeks 25
percent of the proceeds for himself as well
as reimbursement for attorney's fees, costs
and expenses.
Judge Kearse found that qui tam suits,
like Mr. Stevens's, may be filed against
states without violating the Eleventh
Amendment. "To be sure, the qui tam
plaintiff has an interest in the action's
outcome, but his interest is less like that
of a party than that of an attorney
working for a contingent fee," Judge
Kearse wrote. She noted "qui tam claims
are designed to remedy only wrongs done
to the United States" and "substantial
control" over these suits is granted the
federal government.
In addition, Judge Kearse also found
proof in the Act's language and legislative
history that Congress intended States to
be "persons" in these suits. She rejected
Vermont's claims that states should be
immune from suit because Congress did
not explicitly refer to them as targets.
"The goal of the statute is simply to
remedy and deter procurement of federal
funds by means of fraud," Judge Kearse
wrote. "The States have no right or
authority, traditional or otherwise, to
engage in such conduct," so they have no
basis for asserting a shield.
In his dissent, Judge Weinstein called
"dubious" the suggestion that
whistleblowers stand "in the shoes of the
government," noting that since 1996,
whistleblowers have earned a total of
approximately $244 million dollars in qui
tam suits. Summing up, he wrote,
"Entrusting the United States' decision to
sue a state to a qui tam realtor, with an
incentive to sue even when the merits of
the suit are questionable, and even though
its prosecution harms the interests of the
federal government, the state and the
ongoing relationship between the two
sovereigns, effectively short circuits the
moderating processes afforded
congresspersons and state and federal
administrators."
Similar Cases
The Eighth Circuit ruling, issued in
September, which reached the same result
as the Second Circuit, came in a
since-settled case against the University of
Minnesota. In November, the university
agreed to pay $32 million to the U.S.
government to settle charges it illegally
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sold an experimental drug and failed to
report the income to the federal institute
that funded the research.
A Southern District ruling, from Judge
Denny Chin, in June reached the opposite
result (NYLJ, June 15). After Judge Chin
ruled that states could not be sued under
the False Claims Act, New York City and
New York State agreed in November to
pay $49 million to settle claims it
fraudulently collected hundreds of
millions in federal funds between 1990
and 1994 for required foster care services
that were not provided.
In addition to Mr. Hall, Stephen G.
Norten of Paul, Frank & Collins,
Burlington, Vt., represented Mr. Stevens.
In addition to Mr. Shems, David M.
Rocchio, Mark J. Di Stefano, and Rebecca
M. Ellis, Assistant Vermont Attorneys
General, Montpelier, Vt., represented
Vermont.
Counsel for the United States, which
intervened in support of Mr. Stevens,
were Douglas N. Letter and Frank W.
Hunger, of the U.S. Justice Department,
Washington D.C. and Charles R. Tetzlaff,
the Vermont U.S. Attorney, Burlington,
Vt.
Copyright C 1998 NLP IP Company
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